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# *Task Force Meeting*

of

## ASSEMBLY COASTAL NEW JERSEY EVACUATION TASK FORCE

*“Meeting to assess current emergency plans for a coordinated  
evacuation of coastal communities in Cape May and Cumberland counties”*

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**LOCATION:** Canale Training Center  
Egg Harbor Township, New Jersey

**DATE:** August 6, 2007  
2:00 p.m.

### **MEMBERS OF TASK FORCE PRESENT:**

Assemblyman Jeff Van Drew, Chair  
Vincent Jones  
Mariana Leckner  
Francis McCall  
Joseph Sever  
Wayne Rupert



### **ALSO PRESENT:**

Thomas M. Kelly  
Kristin A. Brunner  
*Office of Legislative Services*  
*Task Force Aides*

Christopher Jones  
*Assembly Majority*  
*Task Force Aide*

Jerry Traino  
*Assembly Republican*  
*Task Force Aide*

***Hearing Recorded and Transcribed by***  
The Office of Legislative Services, Public Information Office,  
Hearing Unit, State House Annex, PO 068, Trenton, New Jersey

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**ASSEMBLYMAN JEFF VAN DREW (Chair):** I'd like to welcome everybody to the Coastal Evacuation New Jersey Task Force. Please rise for the flag salute.

(participants recite Pledge of Allegiance)

I'd like to introduce our County Executive, Dennis Levinson, who has been kind enough to let us use his facility, and I know he wants to give us some words of welcome.

**D E N N I S L E V I N S O N:** (speaking from audience) Thank you very much.

It is my pleasure to welcome you here -- the Task Force. We know the problems that are going to face us.

**ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW:** County Executive, if you could just be in front of a microphone. They request -- everything is recorded on a transcript that we do.

**MR. LEVINSON:** I can do that.

It's another example of preparedness, huh? (laughter)

It's on.

Well, thank you very much.

And once again welcome, for those who didn't hear me. Thank you for choosing Atlantic County. We're very proud of what we've done here in Emergency Management. You know, reality has come to this world, this country, this state, this county. We know, the last 10 years, what has occurred. We had just thought we'd have to deal with hurricanes, March floods, high winds, a lot of rain, water. Well, now we understand that some of these disasters will also be man-made, and that most certainly has brought that reality to all of us worldwide.

Now, the thing is, what do we do if something occurs? I guess it's very timely to have this Task Force meeting in August, because tomorrow you may have to implement exactly what you decide you're going to do today. So my serious suggestion would be: You all know -- everyone in this room -- what you have to do. And my serious suggestions is: do it. And let me tell you, I do put my money where my mouth is.

We saw what occurred with the disaster in New York. And even the 9/11 -- the commission said what? The biggest problem after that occurred was what? Communication.

Well, we here in Atlantic County, we had a situation that occurred some years ago with a fugitive going from just municipality to municipality, and our police -- State, local -- could not communicate with each other. They went from one town to another; they were done. We noticed that. What we did is, we put \$6.5 million into a seamless communication system -- 800 megahertz. We self-funded it rather than go through bonding and take that time. Because, let's face it, if you know where you're going to die, you don't go there. So consequently, we felt this was an emergency.

You go back to your towns and your municipalities, the counties that you're from, you find out, "Can you communicate from one area to another?" If you can't, well, you'd better do something to make sure that becomes a reality. That's what we've done here. And we believe that we can communicate in every single section of our county at any given time. And this is EMTs, fire, police, State -- we know we can go and have a seamless emergency operation. And it wasn't cheap, like I said, at \$6.5 million that we put together.

As far as an emergency that does occur, where do you go? Well, if you do -- if you're lucky enough to get everybody to evacuate, where are they going? What shelter? We've got an infrastructure problem also, which we knew we've had for years and years. That will be addressed, of course, after there is a disaster.

We saw what happened in Minneapolis. Well, the first directive from every governor in the states, along with the President of the United States, was what: "Let's check those bridges." Well, you're supposed to check those bridges all the time. Now, suddenly, they became a priority because a 40-year-old bridge collapsed. We felt secure here in our state because every two years we have the inspectors that go out and inspect the bridges, and every four years they go underneath -- the frogmen -- and take a look, what it looks like underneath. Well, obviously, it's not good enough. This was also inspected, and they missed it. And that's an unfortunate circumstance.

So what do we do? We know what occurred with Katrina. And unfortunately, people didn't evacuate. Some years ago in Brigantine we expected a huge storm to hit. We asked everyone to evacuate. Well, many of them did, most of them didn't. They were even handing out toe-tags trying to get people to understand you have to get out. Well, it blew over, and of course, there were so many "I told you so's."

In New Orleans, what did you end up with? You had the old-timers said, "Oh boy, I'm 90 years old. Do you know how many storms I've lived through?" Well, guess what -- this is one that they didn't live through. And when you saw those pictures of those yellow school buses under water, when you knew they had time to get out-- I mean, let's face it, the storm

just doesn't arise immediately. We know from our satellites, we know from our weather predicting, we know that it's on its way. We have to make sure we get people out, number one. Number two, when we do get them out, where are you going to put them? Well, obviously, in Cape May you're going to send them to Atlantic County, right?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER FROM AUDIENCE: Better go farther than that. (laughter)

MR. LEVINSON: You said it.

And what do you do when you get there? And what was another problem with Katrina? "I didn't want to leave my dog." And consequently, most of these shelters don't take dogs. So you're going to provide for that, because human beings are not going to leave their animals behind. "Well, where do we go?" We have to find out where the shelters are going to be. The infrastructure has to be improved yesterday. We know much of our roads are underground. We are shore communities. Those of you from the area right here know that Shore Road in Atlantic County at one time was shore road. Well, now we can go for another three, four miles to find the beach and boardwalk; which, by the way, should have been marshland all the time.

So you have a lot to do today. And my serious suggestion -- and I feel very confident, because of the Task Force that we have, you're in very competent hands -- but I would seriously suggest that we do come to some conclusions. You know, I know committees are going to be formed, and I know we're going to continue to spin our wheels. But let's face it -- again, it's August. August is hurricane season -- August, September. And you know for whatever the reasons are -- I don't know how right Al Gore is,

or how wrong he is -- but I do know these storms are coming with much more regularity and much more fierceness than they have in the past. So let's prepare for it, and let's make this as successful as we possibly can. And as I said, I have every confidence in the world that that will occur; and that infrastructure in the State of New Jersey or any other state in this country is falling apart as we speak.

We here in Atlantic County have 175 bridges and culverts. I didn't know what a culvert was until I went into government. But you're going over bridges and you don't even know you're going over bridges. And when you stop and consider our Delilah Road Bridge is right here in Atlantic County, there's \$25 million. Green Bank Bridge that was just replaced, \$6.5 million. So you can see how expensive it's going to be. Just the estimate for Beasley's Point, right now, just to bring it up to make it for the next 15 years -- what are we looking at, Jeff? -- \$15, \$20 million right there.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Twenty.

MR. LEVINSON: So you can see, it's going to be expensive, but we need the will. Because when it does occur, the finger-pointing is going to start, and that's what our job is.

Thank you so very much. Get started, and I hope for great success. Thank you again.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you, Executive.

MR. LEVINSON: Thank you.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: We also have the Vice Director of the Cape May County Board of Freeholders, and he is in charge

of Emergency Management for Cape May County. Freeholder Ralph Sheets, would you like to say a few words?

**F R E E H O L D E R R A L P H E. S H E E T S J R.:** (speaking from audience) Oh, no -- thank you. It's a pleasure to be here. Thank you. I'm here to learn. You can always learn things. And all the years I've been doing this thing, you know -- 30 or 40 years, or whatever -- there's always new things. And there's a lot of people over the years I've met, I'm glad to see them here, and I'm sure the information we're going to receive and take back to our separate communities will be good. And I appreciate your thoughts, and thank you very much. Thank you.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you, Vice Director. It was always a pleasure to sit next to you on the Freeholder Board.

In the context of learning a little bit, something that I learned about, unfortunately -- and I only digress for a second -- in the political world is something called the *professional tracker*, which is an individual that actually tracks everything that you do during the election process to see if you might say something out of context, you might make a funny face, you might make a mistake, you might do something that was silly, whatever. We have one with us today. It is something that, unfortunately, I have to live with during the campaign season. Mr. Luna is in the back, just so all of you know, that I do make everybody aware of that. His purpose is not governmental, it is political. He goes with me everywhere. He's my new friend. I offered for him to actually ride with me sometimes, but he hasn't taken me up on the offer. However, it's not a big deal, and it really shouldn't be a problem for anybody, but just so that you do know that's his function in life.

With that being said, I would like everybody to introduce themselves and tell me what your area of expertise is and why you're here. We'll start with you Chris.

MR. C. JONES (Assembly Democratic Aide): Christopher Jones. I'm with the Assembly Majority Office. My expertise is not evacuation, but serving the Assemblymen.

MR. V. JONES: Vince Jones, Atlantic County Office of Emergency Management and Emergency Management Director for Atlantic County. And I pray we never have to evacuate.

MS. LECKNER: Mariana Leckner. I'm now with American Military University, Department of Math and Science, formerly with New Jersey OEM, former State Hurricane Program Manager and Evacuation Coordinator; and my specialties are atmosphere and hydrologic hazards for planning, as well as evacuations, and special needs populations.

MR. RUPERT: Wayne Rupert, Undersheriff, Ocean County; also Deputy Emergency Management Coordinator; formerly the Director of the Office of Emergency Management.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I think everybody knows who I am.

MR. KELLY (OLS Task Force Aide): Tom Kelly, Office of Legislative Services. I'm with the nonpartisan research office of the State Legislature.

MR. SEVER: Joe Sever, Office of Emergency Management, County of Cumberland. I've been the Coordinator there for about 22 years.

MR. McCALL: Frank McCall. I'm the Emergency Management Coordinator for Cape May County. And I hope every person

in this room becomes my friend in our untimely need of assistance.  
(laughter)

MR. TRAINO (Assembly Republican Aide): I'm Jerry Traino. I'm with the Assembly Republican Office. Today I'm just taking notes for Vice Chairman Brian Rumpf, who is on vacation with his family.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Very good.

Tell Assemblyman Rumpf that we say hello. He does a great job.

It's good to see all of you here. And the purpose of this entire procedure is essentially to make sure that we are doing everything that we should be doing in the State of New Jersey to ensure a safe evacuation. Quite frankly, and as the Executive has said before and others have said very often, I believe that we can do better. I think, certainly, infrastructure are one of the areas that we have some very serious needs in South Jersey, throughout the state, and indeed throughout the United States of America.

My goal with this is to identify what we can do in the short term, medium term, and long term to make it better, and hopefully not just to produce a report, but actually to be able to effectuate some real change and some real improvements. It was mentioned just a couple of minutes ago, for example, about the Beasley's Point Bridge. We all know that we have limited access and egress in the County of Cape May -- I believe the sixth most vulnerable area in the entire United States. With that being said, we need every access and egress to be able to get out of our county. That isn't the only issue or the only situation. And that is why we formed this Task Force: to identify, in essence, how we can do better; and also to make it very, very clear to people -- not only all of us who are in

government who are experts in the area, but for the people who are constituents -- how serious an issue this is.

What I've asked -- and as we go through this process, we may speak of it a little bit today. But in the future, I truly want people to understand what Cape May County, Atlantic County, Cumberland County, Salem County, Middlesex County -- wherever it is -- and this evacuation force deals all the way up to Middlesex County. This deals with eight counties. I want them to understand what this state is going to look like if we even had, for example, a Category 3 hurricane; what our region is going to look like, and how serious an issue it is. And I think it's quite startling when you actually understand and realize the challenges that we are going to have in order to evacuate the area, in order to maintain the safety of the individual human beings and our pets, and our structures, and everything else that's involved.

You know, it has been said that we have certain mechanisms in place, and we do. And I'm very proud of the work that Cape May, Atlantic, Cumberland, South Jersey, the State of New Jersey has done. But I would also say to you that if there is a Category 3 hurricane that hits this state and hits Manhattan -- if you have to believe where resources are going to go, and you think of the financial districts of Manhattan and some of the areas and some of the challenges that we have in the northern part of the state -- God helps those who help themselves. So for these eight counties that are involved with this Task Force, it's important for us to make sure that we're doing everything that we need to do. And that's what we're here to explore and find out.

With that being said, I will start with testimony. And I'm going to ask Colonel Devery to come forward first. Colonel Dennis Devery. He's from the New Jersey Department of Military and Veterans.

You have a PowerPoint I believe?

**COLONEL DENNIS W. DEVERY:** Yes, sir.

**ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW:** Okay.

**COLONEL DEVERY:** Assemblyman, with me I have Major Minchin, who is my Deputy for the New Jersey Department of Military and Veterans Affairs, Joint Operation Center for Emergency Operations.

**ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW:** Can everybody see? Is everybody good?

Ralph, do you need to move back? Can you see?

**FREEHOLDER SHEETS:** I'm all right.

**ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW:** Okay.

**FREEHOLDER SHEETS:** Thank you. As long as I'm not an obstruction.

**COLONEL DEVERY:** And Assemblyman, we were asked to come down here and kind of explain what our role is and how we would go about assisting these eight counties. And we're responsible for 21 counties across the State of New Jersey in our role in assisting both local, State, county operations. We don't get into the Federal. We do have interaction with the Federal side, but that wasn't-- Our briefing was not about how the Federal -- I see the FEMA Director here, but -- we have that component, but that's not what we're going to talk about today.

(begins PowerPoint demonstration)

First slide, DMAVA -- the New Jersey National Guard works for the New Jersey Department of Military and Veterans Affairs. As such, we're a supporting agency. If you look at the New Jersey Emergency Operations Plans, we are always a supporting agency out there. Basically what that means is that locals, counties, or State agencies ask for our assistance and we provide the things listed on the slide -- to include helicopters, airplanes, personnel, vehicles, high-water vehicles -- assisting, again, public safety and security.

Probably one of the most important things on that slide up there is the note that says, "All missions for the New Jersey National Guard are sent through the New Jersey State Police Office of Emergency Management." All missions come through that process. So local and counties go through the process that's set up for the State through the New Jersey State Police Office of Emergency Management, who then will request our assistance out to whatever counties. They're kind of the vetting arm of requirements out there.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: So we know a Category 3 hurricane is coming. It's on track. What happens?

COLONEL DEVERY: A Category 3 hurricane is coming? We would expect that the local, county, and State agencies would be getting together, starting their planning process. Now, we have, and we're going to talk about--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Which they're going to speak to later.

COLONEL DEVERY: Right.

And we're going to talk specifically about what's Day 5 look like for us, Day 4, Day 3, Day 2, on one of the slides going forward. So that might help understand--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay.

COLONEL DEVERY: But clearly, a hurricane is not an immediate event. We have time to take a look at what's happening there and prepare for it going forward.

Other disasters that they talked about, man-made disasters, those are our immediate events that we have to be prepared to immediately react to. But these -- a hurricane -- we're going to have some time to understand where it's coming and where it's going.

Again, working with the other State agencies to see where, in fact, we think we're going to need the requirements in the counties, in the local-- The more we get together on that, the better off we'll be, with everybody knowing what the requirements are.

So, next slide.

I'll talk a little bit about the missions we're prepared to conduct.

Next slide.

Transportation: Again, vehicle support for emergency movement of personnel, equipment, supplies, vehicles.

Aviation reconnaissance: Again, we have our helicopters -- a fleet of helicopters -- both lift helicopters and reconnaissance helicopters.

Emergency medical ground evacuation: We don't have the ambulances like you would see in a typical ambulance corps out there, but we do have evacuation vehicles that are ambulances. So they're not life-

support ambulances, but they are evacuation ambulances that are all terrain that can get out there and do that.

Fuel handling, hauling, and dispensing: Primarily, we use fuel handling for our own internal assets, but we do have vehicles set aside for retail-type fueling, if needed. For instance, like a Rita situation where you had miles of roads where people start running out of gas, we actually have retail capability to go assist local, county, or State agencies, if that's what's required.

Next slide.

Communications packages: We have a number of different communications packages. Again, the State Police -- the 800 megahertz system -- they've been a great asset to us, working with out Joint Operation Center to get us interoperable across the State agencies in the counties. So again, they're doing a great job. We really work with them a lot.

But this specific item is called a JISCC. And that's provided through us through the Federal Government, through the National Guard Bureau. It has satellite communications capabilities, a number of different radio communications capabilities, laptops. We have one of these. Every state gets one of these now, and we actually have one here. Ours is centered in Fort Dix. A 10-man team we have that runs it. Our current plan is to use that when we have to displace one of our major commands, one of our major organizations, and use it for communications for them. However, if there was another requirement that came through the State Police, we'd be able to assist a county or a local organization with that, or a State agency.

Next slide.

This is kind of the different pieces of that JISCC System that are out there, to include video teleconferencing, portable radios, and satellite connectivity.

Next slide.

Public engineering: Debris again, emergency debris removal. We're not the primary agencies for these things, but we will help, based on the requests that come through the local, county, and State operation.

Power generation, emergency generators.

Next slide.

We do have personnel who are liaison officers to the ROIC for the State Police, where we'll sit there with our personnel. As the requests come in through the State Office of Emergency Management, they'll turn to us and say, "Hey, is this something you guys can do?" "Hey, yes, we'll take care of that mission," and then we forward that mission. But we do have people that were trained by the State Police. And in fact, myself, Major Minchin, went through training at the ROIC on how we're going to work interoperably with the State Police.

Next slide.

Urban Search and Rescue: Again, aviation reconnaissance. We have -- again through the State Police -- we have the capability of actually doing video down-link. So we can take our helicopters with a video camera -- similar to the news actually -- and have it linked back through the ROIC, through the State Police network, so that they can actually see what's going on out there if there was some kind of ability count. Now, in an evacuation, it might be able to provide what roads are out to, again, the State Police and wherever else they wanted to have that capability. And

again, depending on winds and those kinds of things, where we are in the scenario, there's a time at which we won't be able to do that. But after the actual storm goes through, then we'll be able to provide a little bit more of that as well.

Emergency ground transportation, and again recovery -- the aerial recovery piece of it is our -- I'm sure everybody saw it for Katrina -- the hoist. We have UH-68 Blackhawk helicopters in state with hoist capability to hoist people off the roof. Again, the throughput on that is not -- you know, there's not just the throughput that you would get from a ground evacuation. But in emergencies, we can lift off roofs similar to the Coast Guard and other agencies.

Next slide.

Public Safety and Security: We do a lot of this, again, assisting the law enforcement agencies. And during an evacuation, this is what we'd be expecting to do -- assisting the local, and county, and State Police for a reverse lane or whatever else they need out there.

Points of distribution -- those are other, near recovery -- or the recovery efforts when they're bringing in supplies, we would be helping secure those locations and ensure that there's a-- Again, with the local law enforcement, that those places were secure and that there was a timely and orderly distribution of supplies from those facilities.

Next.

This is kind of our timeline, which you were talking about originally. We count D-hour as when the eye of the storm actually hits the coast. So in our planning process, we start five days out from that. The JOC establishes -- the JOC is our Joint Operation Center in Lawrenceville,

where our DMAVA JOC is. Again, maintaining *commo* with the New Jersey State Police OEM and the armory. So we have our own internal (indiscernible) armories in the 21 counties, and then OEM as well -- units prepared for operations.

D-plus-4: JOC is fully operational. We have a cadre of personnel who are at the JOC, like myself, on a continual basis. But then when we go into operations, we expand from the 13 members we have there to about 25 members of the National Guard who are now in that operation. So that will become fully operational.

Then the Armory's Operations Centers are established and affected units move to alternate locations. That is, and specifically in these eight coastal counties, there are hurricane levels at which we know we're going to be flooded out, so we have to jump our units back to -- in the case of Cape May -- back to Hammonton so that we know that -- so that we don't have those graphic images of, like, the buses you had in Katrina where-- I mean, you couldn't move them, so they're all flooded now. So we actually have a plan on Day-4 out to move our stuff that has to be moved out of flooded areas to alternate locations, so that when recovery operations begin, we can get back in, or that we can assist reverse lane, which starts usually about two or three days out. So we're moving four days out to ensure that we're in position to help out three days and two days out for a reverse lane or whatever evacuations are required.

LNOs is -- I've talked about -- they go to the State Police OEM.  
And units prepare to assist evacuations.

And then, Day-3, the initial response elements are in position to support evacuations. Forces execute missions. Again, whatever those

local, county, and State agencies require. And then come sometime, we start hunkering down until landfall. And then we begin recovery operations -- which will be a bigger operation, depending on the size of the hurricane, for our units.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Did you learn anything from Katrina?

COLONEL DEVERY: Yes. We actually -- when we were developing our plans, we actually went and used the Florida model and the Louisiana model and the Texas model for -- how do we backward plan to make sure that we don't have the issues that they had down there? I mean, great organizations down there. But based on the scale of problems, Katrina was a unique thing. Because they are prepared in Florida and in other places for a number of things in the planning cycle. But we do use their model, because they're the experts for this kind of an operation to determine what we need to do and when.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: What model were they using in Louisiana?

COLONEL DEVERY: Well, they have their own emergency operations plans for evacuations in the Guard that's down there. They certainly ran into some issues down there as well. However, I will tell you, the planning process, if executed properly, can do fantastic things for it. And that's -- we looked at those issues.

And I will tell you this: If you go to Louisiana and talk to them -- and we've been down there to talk to them as well -- they will also tell you the things that didn't work. So they can say, "Hey, this was the plan, but it didn't work exactly the way you need to. You need to do 'X'," and so we're

trying to work those in. Like ensuring that your units move out of the affected area in a timely manner because of the surge that's going to come through. Don't leave them there thinking that they're going to be able to shelter in place. Move them back and then move them forward. So, again, we try and take their best ideas and make them work.

Next slide.

These are, again, the units and the locations. And again, this wasn't just for these eight counties, but our specific armories throughout the state where we know, depending on the level of hurricane, where we're going to have to have people move out. So Atlantic City Armory is actually okay in a Category 1 hurricane; but a Category 2 hurricane, they're going to have to jump to Warren Grove, which is where our range is. And again, they'll hunker down there and then come back in for recovery operations.

Tuckerton, Sea Girt, which is farther up north. Toms River is not a -- I think it's a Category 4 that actually has to hit Toms River in order for that unit to have an issue -- but Cape May, Sea Girt, obviously. But again, those units, we now plan for -- we're going to move those units out of the affected area. They know where they're going to jump to and what they have to move in order for them to be able to assist, coming back in.

Next slide.

I think that's it, pretty much. So whatever questions you have.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Let's start with some questions here.

MR. V. JONES.

MR. V. JONES: Is there any reason why Atlantic City couldn't, I guess, maybe side relocate to Hammonton -- the 177th?

COLONEL DEVERY: We had to look at all the different units we had, and the functionality and the spaces we had. And so, when we looked at the different plans out there, that was the best place for them to go. And if you look at the Warren Grove Range, it has an airfield. We can get rapid resupply into that area, and it's probably the closest place. It's high ground -- you'd probably better the range. So it's high ground, it's got an airfield. We can stay there. They have their own power generation. They have their own water supply and whatnot out there. So that's why that would be the closest place. And again, we're pulling -- you've got multiple things moving at the same time, so Cape May is coming back to Hammonton; Atlantic City is coming back to Warren Grove. And we've got a distribution for our own assets as well. That's kind of why that was.

One other thing I would suggest to you -- and it's good to see Vince here -- but we also, again with the State Police, go out to the counties and see their exercises, and try and participate. So we met -- Vince and I met, I guess, about a year ago, maybe, at one of the exercises they had down there; and Joe and us have done some things together, as well, in Cumberland County. So we try and get out to all the different events they're having so that we can better understand what they're doing.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Ms. Leckner.

MS. LECKNER: First I'd like to say that, for those of you who haven't had the pleasure of working with the New Jersey National Guard, you're missing a really great group of people. And if we do have an event, I have all faith that-- In the six years that I was at OEM I had the pleasure of working with Major Minchin and with the Battle Lab doing hurricane simulations and real operations as well -- and a very impressive group.

I only have one comment, and that's to point out that your D-hour is different than the D-hour that's used traditionally in emergencies. I know you're aware of it.

COLONEL DEVERY: Right.

MS. LECKNER: But it's more, actually, to make emergency managers aware of it, that your D-hour is the eye of the storm. Whereas for evacuation planning purposes and traditionally in emergency management, it's with the onset of tropical storm-force winds. So that may or may not cause a communication-- It's internal to the National Guard, so I don't think -- and I know that you speak our language -- so I don't think it's an issue.

COLONEL DEVERY: Right.

MS. LECKNER: But I just wanted to mention that part.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Explain D-hour a little bit more, please?

MS. LECKNER: I don't know if you want to explain yours or--

COLONEL DEVERY: Well, ours, again, is when-- Our emergency management is 39 knot winds, basically -- tropical-- Go ahead.

MS. LECKNER: Miles per hour, yes.

COLONEL DEVERY: Basically tropical--

Go ahead.

MS. LECKNER: With 39 mile-per-hour winds is when resources are pulled. That's when evacuations are halted. That's what the Corps of Engineers does their modeling based on. That's what our emergency planning is based on at Federal, State, and local levels -- is the

39-mile-per-hour wind. And that's fairly traditional. It's different in a military sense.

COLONEL DEVERY: But we are going to-- You know, we actually identified that, like, two or three days ago. I said, "You know what? There could be confusion because of that time period." And we're actually going to move our model for D-hour to the same 39 for these type operations -- to the 39 knot wind impact.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Why is there the difference between--

COLONEL DEVERY: Just -- we did it differently.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay.

MS. LECKNER: Yes. The problem with the 39-- And actually, Jim Eberwine is here from the National Weather Service and he can speak to this. I don't want to, you know, take anything you might add. But one of the big concerns is that there does, with the wind, become a danger with even the cones and barrels that we put out as safety devices becoming projectiles and becoming dangerous. You see pictures of two-by-fours right through the middle of palm trees, you know, in hurricanes, when the winds are very extreme. And when you start getting further and further into the wind speeds, you can flip over cars. So at 39 miles per hour that, theoretically in our area for most storms, will give us about a four-hour window to pull people, pull resources, and make sure that the last emergency vehicle is out of the flood inundation area that's anticipated. It just gives a four-hour, plus-or-minus window to let everybody muster back at their points that they need to, to ride out the storm. So it's -- if we

waited until the eye was there, we would have people on highways and things like that.

Also, bridges are a concern, when we look at Delaware River crossings. At the height of those bridges, the storm may actually be a category higher at the bridge height. So you have to cut off evacuations. Even though people may say the road is passable, that bridge may mean something else. So we just have-- I know you guys are already familiar with this.

COLONEL DEVERY: Right. Yes. And we're going to adjust. Again--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And you're actually adjusting to--?

COLONEL DEVERY: We're going to move to that because -- just so everybody's on the same sheet of music and it's clearer for everybody about when things are going to happen with the same D-hour. Yes, three days ago, I said, "You know, this is going to be confusing, so let's change back." That's what we're going to do.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Rupert.

MR. RUPERT: I must say that we had an opportunity last week to visit the National Guard in Lawrenceville. And our county went in with some notions, and when we left we had a very clear understanding of what are the limitations of what the National Guard can do, and their response capabilities, and a very, very-- We were very impressed with the Colonel's staff and the personnel there, and what they have done in the last

few years to bring the Guard up to a response organization that could be utilized in New Jersey. I think it's great.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you.

Mr. McCall.

MR. McCALL: Thank you, Assemblyman.

I think the Colonel very, very quickly described the system in New Jersey. And I think it's very, very important that that structure is what is utilized in New Jersey. And that is that the New Jersey State Police, Office of Emergency Management is the lead agency and all requests go through that State office. The system works.

Our own personal experience in Cape May County -- the Colonel and I have a recollection of this -- about four years ago with a Northeast storm coming on a weekend, we had a need to call the National Guard for emergency evacuations of the barrier island in the month of August on a Saturday night. Unbeknownst to myself and others, the local Guard armory in Cape May Court House had left. It had gone to Fort Ord, California, during that week. My request was: Can we drive their equipment? You know, we'll have ex-National Guard guys-- And lo and behold, the equipment was railed to Fort Ord, California, which meant we had no assets in Cape May County. Going through our rep -- and I believe Sergeant Massa, who is here today, was our rep. Nick and I sat and talked about it. We spoke with Freeholder Sheets and the other freeholders about the operation going through the New Jersey State Police, who then communicated to the New Jersey National Guard. Within seven hours of our request, we had 24 high-wheeled vehicles in Cape May County. They came from locations like Vineland, Freehold, Camden, Middlesex, Trenton

-- Mercer, and Woodbridge. So for myself, as the Emergency Management Coordinator, I don't need to know what it is that the National Guard does on a daily basis and where their resources and assets are, but I need to know and have confidence in -- and the system works -- that my rep for the New Jersey State Police and I can work through this. They very, very quickly found the resources, and we had, on Saturday afternoon, 24 high-wheeled vehicles. We assigned a police officer from each community to go with the National Guard because those folks were not familiar with the local community, and we served our mission and purpose well.

So I think the highlight of today in this is that the resources are there, and it's the system-- Our system I don't believe is broken. It's been tried and tested. I think the system works, and I just think we need to continue to work through the process of improving upon that system.

Another for example: The Coast Guard, which has their operation and (indiscernible) in Cape May -- they're out of Cape May County four or five days in advance, and they move their people to Fort Dix; they move their large boats out to sea, their small boats up the Delaware River, either to New Castle or to the Captain of the Port at the end of Washington Street, so they're gone.

The one thing I believe is ongoing discussion is the 39-mile-an-hour winds. And I think we need to contribute a look at that. Shucks, we had 39 mile-an-hour winds in Cape May County this weekend, and our beaches were filled. People were on the boardwalk enjoying themselves. So I think we need to have discussion as to what 39 means and not make that a magical number. I think what we need to do is to have more discussion

and more input from a variety of folks to make sure that when we're "pulling the trigger" for an evacuation that we're doing the right thing.

We've been going through a series of tabletop exercises in Cape May County all Summer long, every Wednesday. And that's one of the discussions that comes up, is the 39-mile-an-hour trigger. So we need continued discussion about that, and we look forward to trying to get closer to what the right answer is.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you, Mr. McCall.

Here is a tough question I'm going to ask everybody, so I'm not picking on the two of you, for sure. We are doing well, and I'm very confident in the job that we're doing in the State of New Jersey. How can we do better? If there was something you could change or do, candidly, what would you do?

COLONEL DEVERY: Probably have more meetings like this, and county-- Knowing the faces-- The time for us to exchange business cards is not in 39-mile-an-hour winds; it's now. It's one of the things that we're trying to do from our Department of Military and Veterans Affairs -- reach out to the other State agencies and the county coordinators to ensure that Joe knows Dennis and Gerry knows Frank. All those people kind of understand when there's an emergency, I know who I'm talking to on the other side of the phone and there's a confidence level that, "Hey, you understand what my needs are; I kind of understand where your requirements are." So those continuing coordinations are probably the best thing we can do to make it better for everybody.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Are we falling short anywhere? I mean, the goal here is when we're all done and this Task Force

is done, like any other task force, they'll be a book that is produced with recommendations in it and say, "You know, these are the things that we're doing well" -- and regardless of how good a job you're doing, you can do something better -- "and these are the recommendations to really make it better in New Jersey, to make sure that we're being as effective as we can be." What recommendation would you make, other than that we should have more coordination, more discussion -- which is what we're working on right now. But is there anything else that you would say?

COLONEL DEVERY: There's nothing I can point to.

MAJOR GERALD R. MINCHIN III: Well, one comment I would make, sir, is if we do have the capability-- Because, we've got our timeline for five days out that we're going to stand up and do operations. We've never done that before. These are all based on Katrina and what occurred during that time period. From my experience, we've always done things on the cheap up front, which is, we've brought in a limited number of National Guard personnel to get ready for operations. And if we are moving units or we do have a Category 3 storm, we need to employ a large contingent of National Guard forces early to be able to prepare to respond. We have 6,000 to 8,000 National Guard personnel that can respond within New Jersey, we have hundreds of vehicles, and we have thousands more vehicles, trucks, and troops from surrounding National Guard organizations in other states that we conduct a biweekly hurricane videoconference with.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Explain that to me -- somebody who doesn't know everything about this -- what does that mean, *early*? What happens? We know the storm is coming; it's being tracked to come. We're three days out. What does that mean, *early*? In the State of

New Jersey, for Atlantic -- right now, we're doing Atlantic and Cape May. We're going to have meetings in each region. We're going to be doing Cumberland and Salem, and so forth. But for Atlantic and Cape May County, what's going to happen? You're going to be rolling down the Garden State Parkway, you're going to be coming in by Route 55 and 47. Tell me how that's all going to work.

COLONEL DEVERY: Well, actually, it's in the preparation phase. And this goes back to, again, the models that came from Florida and those other states. They said to me and the people in our leadership, "Hey, guys, you've got to be prepared to front-load your operation." Meaning, you've got to have the personnel up front, ready to move trucks and everything else. Because if it becomes a lesser event, you can always take people back, but you can't bring more people on during the middle of the storm. So that's where our planning cycle actually started more like five days out and four days, because we said, "Oh, well, we'll bring people on as we need." But no, taking a look at those models, we said, "You know what? We actually need to bring people on earlier to move trucks, to move personnel around, to have them in place in a timely manner." That was absolutely a lesson learned from Louisiana and Florida, and whatever. The good news for us is that the Governor's Office in the State has been very -- they understand. They got it. They say, "Hey, you know what? You guys are right." So if you need State active duty to bring your personnel in a timely manner up front, even though we know -- and this is kind of the one issue, okay -- and then it veers off to the left. "Hey, it veered off to the left, thank God, or off to the right and missed us." But we're now -- and previously, we hadn't been. Previously, we were in the mentality of "Well,

we'll bring it in when we need." Now we're kind of front-loading it, so it's going to cost more to the State on the State active duty side to bring these people in. But we think we'll be better prepared. And that's what he's talking about front-loading the operation. So I don't know if you have any experience with that.

MS. LECKNER: Yes. I'd like to make a comment on that, because it plays back into the 39-mile-an-hour idea. The difference between the 39 miles an hour on any given weekend and during a hurricane is, in a hurricane, if you're expecting conditions to worsen, the 39 mile an hour is your harbinger, it's your precursor to that. And you may get up to 50, you may get up to 75, you might get to 125. You may only get up to 75, but you can always back off. You can always discontinue an evacuation order.

COLONEL DEVERY: Right.

MS. LECKNER: But you have to have that level of comfort built into it. Otherwise, you're going to end up with people stranded, trying to play catch-up, really being too far *behind the plate*, as they say. And again, we can have 50 mile-an-hour winds on any given day when there's different types of Summer convective storms.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: For a simple guy like me then, so what we're starting out -- there's a forecast for a storm three, five days out, what's going to happen?

MS. LECKNER: As far as the weather or--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: As far as, it looks like there was a real bad storm coming -- a Category 3, whatever -- what's going to happen?

MR. V. JONES: If we know that there's a storm coming, I mean -- we start five days. I would say it's early, because we're already on the phone with the State Office of Emergency Management, the Weather Service. I mean, they're going, "You'd better keep an eye on this thing as it's somewhere lingering down in Florida." They know. They're looking at the weather conditions and what this storm is going to do. If we think for any stretch that it's going to come even up close near us, again conference calls are going out. We're already -- and we call them a wish list -- but already making our wish list. I'm getting together how many trucks am I going to need to put into Atlantic City and to the barrier islands. Frank's doing the same thing.

COLONEL DEVERY: Frank's definitely doing that.

MR. V. JONES: Yes. He usually beats me to the phone call, I know.

MR. McCALL: Six days out.

COLONEL DEVERY: He usually beats Atlantic County.

MR. V. JONES: Yes. Usually, when I finally get through, he's like, "I'm already on the phone with Frank," so there goes our trucks. But--  
(laughter)

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Cape May's going to be under water quicker, though, let me tell you.

MR. V. JONES: But I've got to welcome them all with open arms, so-- But we are talking way in advance, putting together, again, this wish list, so that when that approval does happen, the stuff is already in place. The worst thing we could do is -- and, again I use the term *playing catch-up* -- but the rain is blowing sideways and we're still in the middle of

trying to evacuate. We can't do it then. We've got to, like you said, front-load. We have to have everything ready to go, and then just a matter of saying, "Okay, we're three days out, it's a go, and we got all the players in place to start doing it," whether we start moving the evacuation, the people who need assistance, the road closures. I mean, everything should be sitting next to the side of the road so when that police officer says, "Okay, it's time to close," we just drag that barricade right across a road and shut it down. If not, we have to wait, "Okay, how soon can you get to that intersection and shut it down?" Everything should already be in place, and just, "Yes, do it before we get caught." I mean, we don't want to get caught in the middle of it trying to run around and then scrambling and putting people in harm's way. Again, they're in the same boat as any other first responder. We don't want to put them in harm's way, but there's got to come a point where we're going to have to stop the operation. If we can get that operation started a lot sooner, that's a blessing. But again, you've got to get that okay from the Governor's Office saying "activate those additional troops and get them moving."

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And you're bringing troops in, but you're also moving some equipment to safer areas at the same time as this progresses.

COLONEL DEVERY: The troops that are coming in will go to those armories. Like for instance, a guy-- The unit in Cape May, if we know it's going to be an issue, we'll say, "Okay, Day 5, move that armory equipment." They'll come in to move that armory equipment back to Hammonton and then be ready to do operations. And that's a significant mind change that has happened very well, and the Governor's Office

absolutely supports it. That, “Hey, we need to have them up front.” And you have to have confidence that the agencies that are out there are going -- if they can ramp down, they will ramp down as quickly as they need to. The good news for Major General Rieth, who is my Commissioner, he’s got a great relationship with the State Police and with the Governor’s Office. And they understand, if he says he needs X, that’s what he needs. And he will take people off as soon as he doesn’t need them anymore. That’s probably the best thing that we’ve done, moving forward and continue to do.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: We have enough manpower if we need it? We do?

COLONEL DEVERY: Yes, sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay. How many days to get-- A Category 3 is coming. How many days does it take to evacuate Atlantic County?

MR. V. JONES: There’s varying numbers.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I know there’s varying--

COLONEL DEVERY: What month? What month?  
(laughter)

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I want to hear what yours is.

MR. V. JONES: The best guess. I mean, Jim--

MS. LECKNER: Maybe Jim can address that.

MR. V. JONES: There’s a lot that’s going to go into that decision, but we’re looking at -- again, depending on the timing, the population, low tourists, high tourists-- And Frank will tell you, “What do we say? In summertime it always high tourists.”

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Give me the worst case scenario -- height of the Summer.

MR. V. JONES: Worst case scenario we're looking at around -- anywhere from 40 -- around 40 hours, 40 to 42 hours.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Two days.

MR. V. JONES: Again, that's everybody complying and leaving. We know that's not going to happen.

J A M E S E B E R W I N E: (speaking from audience) That's before the watch is put on.

MR. V. JONES: Exactly.

MR. EBERWINE: So you're going to have to ask--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I know you wanted to speak, too. Please, I think you have to speak into the microphone. If you could just pull your chair over and move over, scootch over.

MR. EBERWINE: Thank you, Mr. Van Drew.

I was going to address the 39-mile-an-hour wind. A 39-mile-an-hour wind sustained is far different than a gust of 39. And the idea behind it is, our computer models are based on evacuations when the 39-mile-an-hour sustained winds intersect what we call a *decision arc*. This is a Hurrevac program that we run in the State of New Jersey. The decision arc is placed around a particular point on the coast. We'll take Cape May in this case. And you look at your high occupancy, you look at the speed of the storm, the strength of the storm, and it draws a circle around Cape May. It could be 150 miles, it could be 200 miles out. As the storm is coming up from the Bahamas, or the Atlantic Basin, wherever the radius of 34-knot winds, which is 39 miles an hour, intersects this decision arc that's drawn by you,

that's when it's time to consider evacuations. So, if you've ever been in 39-mile-an-hour winds -- and many of the coastal people have with Nor'easters-

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ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: We all have, yes.

MR. EBERWINE: --with Nor'easters it's far different than just a gust. And the other thing you know about it, when you hit 39, the winds are not going to get any lower if you're going to keep getting progressively higher. And some of the trees in New Jersey can be felled by 40-mile-an-hour winds. So now you've got a matter with debris getting on some of the roads. And long before you get into that, you're already into the outer bands from the storm, and you've got maybe five, 10 inches of rain. So that's why the 34 was employed, and it works very well with our Hurrevac model. And I'm sure they've seen that. A sustained wind is far more different than a gust.

MR. V. JONES: Some of the considerations we have to take into account, again -- and that's why it's imperative that we get on a conference call with the Weather Service -- is we have to look at the amount of rain that is either -- already has fallen, the tides; because our evacuation roadways, unfortunately, flood out a lot of times. Forget the tide--

MR. EBERWINE: Prior to, yes.

MR. V. JONES: --the little bit of tide that we have. The rain -- we're going to lose those roadways. So, I mean, they are literally going to become impassable, as down in Cape May and even in Cumberland, some roads. So we start looking at the infrastructure. I mean, there's a lot that-- People think, "Oh, once those -- you just make a decision to evacuate." It's

not that simple. There's a lot that has to go into it. Forty hours may not be it. We may have to actually push that back maybe 50 hours out, start doing some voluntary evacuations. Because again, buying us the time with those roadways going under.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And you all make that call together?

MR. EBERWINE: Yes. We work very closely with the State and the county and everybody.

MR. V. JONES: Everybody -- the Guard. We all have to be on the same page. Because if not, it's not going to work. I can't wait for two foot of water in Atlantic City before, "Oh, yes, by the way, I need trucks." They've got to be there moving those personnel at the time we're doing that. It's got to be a totally coordinated effort.

MR. EBERWINE: The other thing that you have to consider in the State of New Jersey, outside being the most densely populated state, this Category 3 that we're going to be working with is going to affect maybe six other states, not just four other counties. So you're looking at a situation where if the Colonel is looking for a Category 3 to make landfall in New Jersey, where are you going to get the help if New York is affected -- Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: That's what I was alluding to before. I mean, my concern would be that -- just knowing how, quite frankly the way of the world and how things happens -- that if the financial centers of Manhattan are going to take a hit, and northern New Jersey, and some of the chemical plants and some of the things that exist up there, where are we going to all fall in that process?

MR. EBERWINE: Well, I know after Response '98 -- which was I think the largest exercise that FEMA had held up to that time -- was a Category 3 making landfall, I think in Monmouth County. And just knowing it was an exercise was overwhelming too many people. Because those scenarios you talk about were being fed to the people, and they were reacting to all these situations. And it was like it was really happening to some people, because it was so overwhelming. I mean, you've got, just in New York-- You bring up New York City -- and we're working with a model for New York City; in fact, I'll be up in New York Wednesday -- you've got 3.1 million people in the storm surge area right there.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: So how are we going to fall out? In other words-- I mean, that's my question again. Quite simply, with the population density that exists in northern New Jersey and New York City, even though we are more vulnerable -- that's why we chose these eight counties -- how is that all going to fall out? What's going to happen?

COLONEL DEVERY: I would say for planning purposes, again, the State Police, again, has the EMAC process, Howie Butt and his guys have a great-- Again, it goes to planning. Hey, where's the gaps in the stuff that we know we're going to need across the state? So the State Police have that piece that they work with all the different agencies on gap analysis. And then internal to the Guard, which Major Minchin was alluding to, is every week-and-a-half, two weeks, we have a meeting with the National Guard Bureau with all the south and mid-Atlantic states talking about who's going to be able to help who. And we've literally talked to them about, in addition to EMAC, where our resources are going to come

from -- from helicopters to trucks, or whatever. And those states have said, "Hey, we're going to provide it."

Now we look-- We have some states in the area, but it could be affected by a hurricane. So what we look for is Indiana, Iowa, Illinois -- the Midwest states -- can you guys come help us? And they say, "Okay, yes. This is what I got: CHH-47s will come out--" But that's the planning process on how we do it. If it was going to actually happen, we would then say to the State Police guys, "Hey, we need an EMAC request for X," and then the State Police handles -- the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, which is what EMAC stands for. They take care of that and then send out, with the Governor's approval, through their representative, to the other state to say, "Hey, we want these assets in." So the great news is that we're already planning all that. The State Police are planning on that and the National Guard itself is planning on that, and how we make that happen. Because we're going to bring them in from other states as well.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: So we would be protected; we could be covered, because these resources would come in from other states.

COLONEL DEVERY: They could. If we can't do it at our level, then one EMAC can go through with the State Police and/or National Guard assets; and then the next part of it, that's even bigger, is when we get the FEMA guys and Colonel Freehill, who is the Defense Coordinating Officer over there. If there are issues that even get beyond that capability then you're looking at the active army guys coming in through NORTHCOM, through the DCO, and Colonel Freehill is always talking to the State Police guys as well. So there's a lot of backups to the backups to the backups.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Frank, how long does it take to get out of Cape May County -- height of the season, right now?

MR. McCALL: Forty hours, maybe 48. We just got finished doing two studies that contradicted some of the earlier studies that were provided. And all we did was took one variable, and that was moving the number of cars per household from, I think it was, 1.2 to 3.4. And the worst case scenario went from 36 hours to 48 hours just with the one variable.

Assemblyman, as you're aware, the infrastructure in Cape May County is very, very limited. We have the Garden State Parkway. We had Route 9 until the Beasley's Point Bridge went out. So we have the Parkway to Route 50 and then west on 49. We have Route 47 and Alternate 347, behind the prison, as our two primary evacuation routes. This week in Cape May County we probably have 750,000, 850,000 people enjoying themselves, except for today's rain. So we're looking at a worst case scenario -- the best case scenario this time of the year, we think, 40 to 48 hours.

And I think that raises to a question. When we have taken our previous experiences -- Hurricane Gloria, in 1985, is one; Hurricane Floyd -- when was that, Jimmy, 1990--

MR. EBERWINE: Ninety-nine.

MR. McCALL: --1999. When we looked at the SLOSH model and Hurrevac with Hurricane Floyd, my recollection is it came up the coast as a Category 4, went behind Norfolk, up the Chesapeake as a Category 3, came up through Maryland and Delaware as a Category 2, came across Delaware and came out of Slaughter's Beach, when it hit there, as a tropical

storm. So we were down to 39 miles an hour. On Wednesday of that week, in the telephone conference, a gentleman from the DCA told me that I had to cancel the firemen's parade that was that Saturday because of the SLOSH model that was giving the prediction of the storm coming up and hitting Cape May County as a Category 1.5 or 2. I had to cancel the Wings and Water Festival. I had to close down the Jazz Festival in Cape May City. And my response was, respectfully, that we weren't going to do that, because we had a heavy reliance --and a very, very good reliance -- on, one, Jim Eberwine, who was able to give us the modeling data very, very accurately. Max Mayfield -- Jim, you and I were on a conference call with Max, who was then the Director of the Hurricane Center.

So when we look at these kinds of things, we need to know what it is that's happening to us. And I understand we're here in the worst case scenario, trying to figure out where we are and where we're going to be. But if we rely on any one or two indications, or three or sometimes even less than a dozen indications as to what's transpiring, we may miss the mark entirely. So I think the preparation -- and that's why we've been talking about this large regional approach to emergency management outside of the tri-county area. Joey, Vince, and I meet twice a year as a group. We've encouraged the State Police, and they're doing that, looking at this large regional approach to emergency management.

But we need to understand what it is that we're talking about. People are throwing out numbers of 80 miles an hour, 120 miles an hour. What does that really mean to us and what is the reactionary time that -- what's reality going to be? And I think all the preplanning is something that we need to be cognizant of. So I think that deserves more ongoing

discussion. I know we're having it in Cape May. We're having it with the State Police, with the Army Corps of Engineers. Because we have two things here. One, we need to protect our citizens. I think we're looking to do that. But on the same token, if we make too many mistakes too often, when the times comes to have the real call go out, we're going to be behind the eight ball, pretty well. So the kinds of things we're talking about here as moving forward are great, but we also need to focus on what reality can be, and take into consideration more than just a Hurrevac model and some of the other little things that are passing around as buzz words.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Very good.

MS. LECKNER: I'd like to make one brief comment -- I'm sorry -- just a brief follow-up on that is: make sure that everybody is aware that each of these tools -- Hurrevac, SLOSH -- they are tools that are to be used in concert with each other and other tools. The skill of the Emergency Manager is the crux of what's going to make things succeed or fail. The tools just tell them what might happen in a particular scenario given this mathematical model that this person developed. Not one single tool is going to be accurate 100 percent in what to do or what's going to happen. In fact, they're all going to be inaccurate. But used together, they help make decisions.

The second thing that I just want to caution, and I understand that there are so many considerations -- social, economic, political, environmental considerations -- in evacuations, is that when we have something like a Hurricane Floyd, where we had the largest peacetime evacuation in U.S. history and nothing happened-- Down in South Carolina and Georgia, they evacuated millions and millions of people.

These people were furious. "You made us leave our houses," everything ground to a halt, people were stuck in traffic for 20, 30 hours. It was a nightmare. Not one person died.

Katrina -- they were behind it. There wasn't even the attempt to force out certain evacuations, and look what happened. The fallout if people die is much worse than the fallout if you have economic or political losses. And I wouldn't want to be the one to say, "Hey, the storm is predicted to come up here," and then the storm shifts and, "Yay, we're free." But if the storm is coming up, I wouldn't want to be the one to say, "Let's leave everybody where they are." There is a certain amount of error that's going to be in the forecast. And five days out, that error is going to be more than three days out, is going to be more than one day out. But at some point, you have to make a decision, and that's where skill comes in. That's where the Emergency Manager works with -- and again, the National Guard. These conference calls have sometimes 75 people on them, between all the different agencies. And it's the skill of all those people collaboratively, who are using these tools, to make the correct decisions. There's never going to be one formula.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I know. And that's, to me, always the fascinating and frightening part when you make that call, and it's embarrassing if you make the wrong call, but can also be deadly if you make the wrong call. And that's the real judgment.

Joe -- Cumberland County -- you're going to be evacuating a little of it, and you're going to have a whole bunch of people coming in.

MR. SEVER: Yes. Or more of an impact will be, of course, Cape May County coming in. But for our area of the county is about a 10-

hour evacuation, because we're all bay shore communities, very small communities. So the timeline is, like I said, 10 hours. But the impact of Cape May County evacuating will be our biggest thing to be concerned with, because of 347 and 47 and 55. Because basically you're going to split the county in half with all the traffic problems that we're going to have. So that's our major concern.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And I think that is just a huge issue, and we're really not going to address it right now. But I think the biggest issue that we have is infrastructure and actually getting people out on the roads.

And I just happened to think -- this Sunday, I was going to a meeting up north -- I was going up to Atlantic County and I was leaving Cape May County. And it was relatively late. And this was a very busy weekend -- you're right, Frank, it was. All the tourist destinations did well this weekend, it was jam-packed. The Expressway was packed; at 8:00 at night it was still going. You couldn't even get onto it. So we're going to have real issues of getting people out because of the limited infrastructure we have.

Ocean County?

MR. RUPERT: Well, it looks like our worst case scenario would be about a 44-hour evacuation. And when you talk about infrastructure, we've got Long Beach Island--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Unbelievable.

MR. RUPERT: --one way on and off. They call it the Causeway; it's a series of four bridges. And it's my recent understanding that they're rated, out of 100 -- their safety rating is down to 47. And

that's a State-owned bridge, so the State is going to have to do something to improve that. Additionally, once you get off that island and start heading west, you run down from three lanes to two, and then to one, in each direction. If you know where you're going and you know another way home -- the way I like to put it, I think everybody ought to know another way home. All right? They say that the -- there's an old saying that sometimes the long way around is the short way home. And it's true.

Just about everybody that comes there either comes down Route 72 from the west Jersey area or from Philadelphia, or they come down from the Garden State Parkway. There's other ways home, but nobody knows what they are. And then people should be finding that out. I have a trailer over in Pennsylvania. I usually take the Pennsylvania Turnpike, but I do know another way home if I have to use it, and it is a long way around.

As stated, Ocean County needs additional roadways in the southern part of the county. And then in the northern part of the county, we start running into needing to share the roads with Monmouth County's evacuees, because they're going on the same roads eventually. So you have a lot of folks from Monmouth and Ocean County coming together on Route 195, Route 9, the Parkway, if you're using the Parkway. It could get very, very jammed up.

In addition to that, there's a point on the Parkway where if the tide gets there before the cars do the Parkway may be under water, up around Morgan Creek. There's a lot of different things that need to be examined and looked at and improved to facilitate a rapid evacuation.

However, I have to agree with what Mariana said. We don't want to evacuate too early and find out we didn't need to, because the next time nobody is going to believe us. We don't want to evacuate too late and drown anybody. And I think the thing that happened in Louisiana was, as I said before, folks chose not to evacuate because of their history. They said, "Ah, it never happens here." I've heard people say the same thing in our area, "It never happens here."

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Absolutely.

MR. RUPERT: You can't go by that. This may be the time it does happen, and you've got to be prepared to respond properly.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you.

One thing I'm going to ask from this Task Force -- everybody who is on it, everybody who is participating in it -- is a specific list of infrastructure improvements that they believe are needed for evacuation purposes. Not for any other reason, but specifically for evacuation purposes. And I know that's a little bit pie in the sky, and I know that's not going to happen overnight, but that's part of the long-range process. I mean, we at least should have assembled the necessary infrastructure improvements that need to be accomplished, and at least we know what they are. And perhaps that could be damning in a sense because, God forbid anything happens in the future, we know it and we haven't acted upon it. I guess it is, but it's also important to have it. So I would ask whether it's Ocean or Middlesex or Cape May or Atlantic or Cumberland, or wherever, that we put that together.

Any other questions for these gentlemen? (no response)

Thank you for being here.

COLONEL DEVERY: Thank you.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: If you could stay for a while, too, in case there are any other questions that we might have.

COLONEL DEVERY: We will.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you.

We're going to ask Mr. Kempf to come forward, from FEMA.

God help you, not an easy position to be in right now.

**S T E P H E N K E M P F J R . :** It never is.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you for being here. You are the Region II Regional Administrator. I know that I could say that.

MR. KEMPF: That's right, Assemblyman Van Drew.

Thank you for the opportunity to come in and speak to you and the Committee. My name, for the record, is Stephen Kempf Jr. As the Assemblyman said, I am the Regional Administrator for the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA Region II.

I noticed that a number-- I didn't bring any kind of slide projection with me because there are just so many caveats that we have to deal with when we're looking in emergency management. I'm a lifelong resident of New Jersey. I've been in emergency management for -- almost embarrassed to say -- 40 years. I have worked with my good friends Wayne, Joe Sever, Frank McCall, in various capacities in Emergency Management, and know probably most people in the room. And they likewise know me and my perspectives on things.

What I had been hoping for prior to speaking was to get in behind the State of New Jersey, so to speak. And the reason for that is very simply that, in any preparedness activity, New Jersey is a Home Rule state,

and things are done preparatory by the local municipalities, through the county, up through the State Office of Emergency Management. We in FEMA support all of those activities.

And one of the ways that we've been doing that and looking into it, sir, is over this past eight months we started a little project. Having been in emergency management a very long time, you kind of get to the point where you get tired of slapping yourself on the back for the things you can do and have a tendency to forget about the things you cannot do. When I mean *us*, I mean us collectively. So we created what's called a *gap analysis tool*, and my staff has been meeting with the staffs throughout the state, mostly in the affected coastal communities in New Jersey, through the New Jersey State Police Office of Emergency Management, the County Coordinators, and then whatever local coordinators have been available. And we looked at seven key areas, and of course for your purposes, the evacuation. And we have found that, you know, there's always gnatty little issues in any area, but overall we've found no key issues that the State is severely lacking in. And we feel confident that the State has a very good chance of doing it's evacuation, but there are some caveats that go with that.

The very first one is one that has very little to do with the actual planning that we do, and really is in the laps of the people that we serve -- in the form of complacency. We are not in a storm-experienced area, such as the Gulf, or Florida, things of that nature. And which, by the way -- and I say this respectfully to the people in the Gulf -- New Jersey and our areas up here are not Gulf. We are, fortunately, more resource-rich because of the type of and character of our culture. And our density and

such, I believe that we're very much ahead of the curve in a lot of the planning that we do through the Office of Emergency Management.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Tell me specifically why we are in better shape than Louisiana? Why we're in better shape than the Gulf? Why we're going to be better prepared? I mean, the interest in all this, from our constituents, from the Legislature, is based upon the fact -- from what we think really went wrong in Katrina. And a great deal, respectfully -- of course, not you -- but a great deal went wrong with FEMA, as well, and they were under a great deal of criticism. Federally, there was a great deal of criticism for the Federal Government. Convince me, show this Committee why FEMA's interaction would be better in the State of New Jersey and why we are better prepared than Louisiana was.

MR. KEMPF: Okay. That's just where I was trying to go with the gap analysis.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay. I know I jumped the gun. I can't help it.

MR. KEMPF: (laughter) But it's a very complex issue. And we have a tendency to point the finger in one direction to try to figure out what our ills are or our problems are, and many times they're multifaceted in the Gulf. And I'm not here to beat up what's wrong with the Gulf. We know we had some mistakes in FEMA, and FEMA has been doing a lot of work to address those problems that we've recognized on our part. But a lot of them had to do with the local involvement, from local officials to the people, right down the line. And one of them is the complacency of the people.

My personal feeling is that we have not put enough effort over the years into better educating our people as to what these storms are really all about. I know NOAA has done a remarkable job in trying to convey this. But it's kind of like an auto accident -- if you're not in one, it's hard to imagine what they're really like. So we have that problem of complacency.

And also, someone mentioned a little earlier, one of the those things within the Emergency Management community itself sometimes, we deal with a lot of what-ifs and possibly this thing and the other thing, and sometimes we, ourselves, don't fully believe that we are as vulnerable as we really are in the Northeast. And through the State Office of Emergency Management, I know that Major Arroyo and his staff have gone to great lengths to try to make sure that we can overcome that kind of thinking. So I guess we have, I guess, a believability issue before us, both from the public and within ourselves. Overcoming that, I think that New Jersey especially has been challenged by many, many other types of disasters because of our society. We've had Northeasters. We've had -- and the experience partially -- terrorism attacks like that against the World Trade Center. That certainly set us -- many of our people were involved with that and many other things that we have as a daily part of our lives, that are not really experienced by many other parts of the country.

And also, for the most part, we are fairly -- I don't want to call us resource-rich -- but resource-better-off than many. Sometimes because our state is not as large as some other states, we have the ability to sit down with our counterparts in emergency management, put the cards on the table and talk to those kinds of problems that we have. Having been both in the

Radiological Emergency Response Program, as well as all the others in New Jersey, it was a familiar activity, as it still is, for the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management to sit with county coordinators and local coordinators, and FEMA is right there sitting with them, for the most part, in talking about these issues.

And that now brings me to what I was talking about before, sir, is the gap analysis. The gap analysis is just a commonsense tool to sit down and talk about what are the issues that we would have in a certain type of catastrophe -- for our purposes here, evacuation. One of those is always the concern about our summertime population, where some municipalities swell from maybe a couple hundred thousand to, perhaps, a million-and-a-half or more, and put great demands on our ability to move those people. But if you really look at it, as we were talking about earlier, the key here is to take advantage of the early notices that we are getting from NOAA, and communicating to those people and getting people to move out on a recommendation, as opposed to order. And if we can do that in a more controlled and coordinated fashion, you won't have quite the same types of traffic issues that you have, for example, experienced this weekend; which I did too, by the way. If you look at that, you're moving -- you've got a whole state full of people who are moving, number one, trying to get to home or other, or vacation destinations, whatever they are. When we are doing projections -- again, whenever I say *we*, I don't mean *we* FEMA, I'm talking about *we* collectively in emergency management throughout the region -- we're looking at the targeted areas.

I think, as Jim mentioned before, there are certain indices that they use to give out their cautions and such. I kind of call it the *bowling*

*alley effect*. If we see a storm coming up and there's certain conditions, it's rolling here, then we have a better chance of getting hit, obviously. So as we see that, we are working with the State Office of Emergency Management, who in turn is coordinating with the local county coordinators to start the evacuation, putting out the early notices, trying to get the people going, identifying the special needs populations -- those people who are either handicapped, elderly, infirm, and so on -- and pulling in the appropriate resources to move them effectively, early so that the resources that would be used to move them would then fall in for other types of situations that may occur during an evacuation.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay. I know we're going to have a few questions.

MR. KEMPF: Certainly.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I'm going to go back to just a couple -- and I want you to stay there.

When we speak of the 40 hours, 48 hours, whatever, is that taking into account that some people-- I mean, there's going to be what I'll call the *funnel effect*. It's going to get jammed up on the Garden State Parkway, for example -- everybody is trying to get north. So folks are going to be evacuating out of Ocean County. Some of them are going to be going to the Garden State Parkway. Folks are going to be bottled up towards the Expressway coming from both Cape May County and from Atlantic County -- there's going to be the issue there -- and the Parkway. And of course, we're going to have the Cumberland County issues, which are horrendous with Route 47 -- specifically Route 47, more than Route 55. That time

frame that takes into account that everybody during a big storm is going to be leaving at once.

MR. V. JONES: At the same time, no.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: It does not.

MR. V. JONES: No. That's one of the key things -- getting everybody on the same page. Particularly, Cape May County is usually the first to go, as we put it. But the timing of when Frank begins to evacuate, for instance -- and I'll just speak Cape and Atlantic -- when he begins to evacuate Cape May County, at that same time we look to -- we have a zoned evacuation, so we look at Brigantine being literally an island. They only have the bridge, one way in, one way out.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: The one bridge, yes.

MR. V. JONES: We'll begin to evacuate, start moving Brigantine at the time Frank is beginning to move the southern part of Cape May County. So that way, by the time -- in theory, again, luckily we never had to do it -- but by the time Cape May County, some of the stragglers or some of the traffic does begin to come up into Atlantic, either the Parkway or the Expressway, or we have to start moving some other people out -- Ocean City -- Brigantine is almost going to be empty. And then we can begin looking at the city of Atlantic City, trying to funnel them out the Expressway, some of the alternate routes. So timing is critical. And we all have to be on the same page.

So for me to start dumping my people before Cape May, just forget it, they'll never get out. The people in Cape May will just never be able to get out. So it's got to be timed perfectly. That's why it's critical that we're all on the same page -- "Okay, when's Cape May going to go?"

Atlantic, you know you got to start doing that.” Ocean County might start moving some of their population. The timing -- it all is going to come down to timing.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: That’s some of the modeling that you’re doing. In other words--

MR. V. JONES: Some of the modeling, and again looking at where they’re going to go. Like Wayne said, everybody -- they’re going to try to all go out the same way if they don’t know any other way. Most of the locals will find their little -- they know some of the back roads. They’ll start using some of the back roads. The problem is, a lot of vacationers now are starting to find those same back roads.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And just these things pop in my head: If there are accidents, as well, on the roads. I mean, the one issue-- I know the New Jersey Institute of Technology looked at Route 47 and said that it wouldn’t be as functional as we originally thought it would, for different reasons. It would end up to some degree -- colloquial terminology, *becoming a parking lot* -- they would be all jammed up.

MR. SEVER: Right.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I’m just trying to picture in my head how this all happens.

MR. V. JONES: Well, you saw it this weekend.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes, I did see it this weekend. That’s what really makes me--

MR. V. JONES: And in theory, there’s plans that they would -- literally, you’ve got to keep traffic moving. You’d push the vehicles off to the side of the road. There’s a lot of what-ifs still that are in the plan.

MS. LECKNER: I want to jump in. Sorry, Vince. I really want to jump in.

We should get Jason Miller from the Corps here to explain how the modeling is done. Because the clearance times do--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: We will.

MS. LECKNER: Yes. They do-- It's not a linear time like the first car starts and the last car, and that's 44 hours. It compensates for that bell curve of the way that behavior happens, that at first if you're going to have some evacuations it includes -- there's going to be some shadow evacuations, meaning people who are not ordered but are going, because they're fearful. It includes background traffic. You've got your long-haul, short-haul trucking going on still. You know, your normal traffic on the roadways. It's included in the modeling so that when it says 44 hours, that's for a particular condition, high-season Category 3, 4 storm, and that means that people responded slowly. Meaning the people didn't heed the order right away -- that they're sort of-- The bell curve is going to have a different curve shape than if people had responded more quickly, or to a Category 1. So Jason can explain all that.

But it does include a number of variables. It's not just saying, "How long does it take to get  $X$  number of people from Point  $A$  to Point  $B$ ?"

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: This is going to be a crazy question -- I'm really trying to find out, I'm not trying to be-- Do you all think it's going to work?

MS. LECKNER: It actually worked better in New Orleans.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: No, you don't--

Mr. Jones.

MR. V. JONES: I shouldn't say-- It's going to work, but when you take in--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: It's not going to work as smoothly as we would hope.

MR. V. JONES: And I say, you're doing this day in and day out as we do, you take that human factor into play, they're going to wait until the last minute. And it's going to be, "Hurry up and come get me."

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: That's what I wondered. The people are staying to the last minute because they don't want to leave their shore homes or they don't want to leave their property.

MR. V. JONES: Well, I can tell you the issue with the casinos.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: The people are going to panic on the road, and we're going to--

MR. V. JONES: The casinos are going to be the-- It's going to -- not to say they're not going to close, but they're going to wait until the very last minute. Well, what do you do with all those day-trippers?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: It's about dollars.

MR. V. JONES: What are you going to do with all those day-trippers? They've got to go somewhere. Somebody has got to take them somewhere.

MR. KEMPF: And if you add to that, many people along the Jersey shore spend in upwards of \$3,000 to \$5,000 a week. If I was there, I wouldn't be giving it up too easily. You know, we've always heard the stories of the surfer who wants to be there to take pictures or to take the first wave. Those are the kinds of-- To go back to what I originally opened

with, is the complacency. The public information -- we need somehow to be able to really capture the people's attention. And we've dealt with this -- Wayne and I have worked on this for years with the Radiological Emergency Response Program dealing with, say, Oyster Creek. If you have a fast-moving event, how do you get people to move when you want them to? The same thing happens with other types of hazards -- a chemical spill or gosh knows what else -- forest fires, those types of things.

I think one of the benefits of this type of Task Force is the fact that this will become, if it isn't already, recognized by the members of the Task Force that we really need to put a lot more, I guess, of our resources into bringing the public in, and getting them to understand and getting them to accept the fact of what all these folks are going through in the process of trying to make a determination for evacuation.

With that being said-- I'm sorry, sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Before, just on that point, one of the areas we want to approach -- and I don't mean to say it this way is -- but in a good way and a positive way, we want to scare people a little bit. We want to frighten them a little bit to realize this is a serious issue. And one of the things that I've asked for us to do as we go through this process -- more than once -- is to really show people in their respective areas -- and we haven't done it today, but we are going to do it for the Cape/Atlantic areas as well when we come back -- what it's really going to look like. In other words, that's what I want to see and even understand better. What's it going to look like? That Category 3, and the process takes place. By the time we're done with this Task Force, I really do want to see that from beginning to end. What's going to happen? Who's going to kick in?

Where's FEMA going to be? Where's the Guard going to be? Where is every -- each and every piece -- the Office of Emergency Management, the respective -- the State Police? And what are the counties specifically going to look like? For example, my home county, Cape May, I know is mostly underwater in that situation. A good chunk of Atlantic is. I guess a good chunk of Ocean is, certainly.

I mean, this is something that I'm hopeful -- and we certainly can't guarantee that -- I'm hopeful, if we really get the proper coverage through the media and through others -- when people realize how serious it is-- I was speaking to a group of constituents, and I said, "Do you realize, in our area, what it truly would be like and how much -- where the water would be?" And they think, "Well, gee, if I'm not right on the barrier island, if I'm not in Brigantine, and I'm not in Sea Isle, or in Cape May, or on Long Beach Island, I'm probably okay." That's the farthest thing from the truth. People don't understand the full dimension of a Category-- And I use Category 3, because that's one that could happen.

MR. KEMPF: Yes, it can.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: So I hope that's one of the outcomes that we have here. And it's one thing I'm going to insist that we really do in this process -- is continually try to show people. And, hopefully, the media really brings that forth. If they see it, I hope that they understand how serious an issue it is.

MR. KEMPF: On that point, too, I'd like to offer our agency. I know we-- Major Arroyo is in the back. I hope we're not putting a lump in his throat back there. (laughter) But we've worked very extensively. We

have a lot of that type of information that we would be very happy to provide to the committee.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: That would be good.

Mariana, we had even talked about some sort-- You have some-- There is something we can do that actually will--

MS. LECKNER: Yes, with HAZUS. And I actually spoke--

Steve, I was down at EMI a few weeks ago, and I spoke with the mitigation folks down there about possibly even getting a training for IT individuals. We've been training emergency managers on HAZUS, but not-- I don't think a single emergency manager in the state has either the computer equipment or the time to run these models. They take a long time to run. So it's possible to run them, and it's possible to host a course in New Jersey. It's just a matter of finding somebody who has the time to do it.

We might be able to use FEMA. I know in the past we've borrowed FEMA people to help us with planning. So I'm sure that something -- probably one of the first things that we might request support from is creating a HAZUS model, maybe for something like Long Beach Island -- which, you know, we've got the one access/egress point, where you can see the actual dollars amount damage and what's done.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Which I think would be productive.

And the other actual result of this Task Force, I would like to see, is how we can better inform. And I know we're doing a good job. This is not to be critical -- but how we can do a better job in making the public

be cognizant of the reality of how dangerous this could be. That should be another specific recommendation.

Yes, Jim.

MR. KEMPF: Reading my mind.

Come on up.

MR. EBERWINE: Since Katrina, I've been on a whirlwind tour of hurricane preparedness. And businesses are getting into it, TV stations. If Katrina were to hit New Jersey as it did -- Category 3 -- Cape May to Barnegat would look like Biloxi, Mississippi. And North Jersey would look like New Orleans. Because if you look at North Jersey, in many ways, it's similar to what happened in New Orleans. It will flood for weeks on end. And it will continue to flood. We saw that in Floyd.

So how do you scare the public? The idea is to scare them in the one sense, but do it in such a way that you're educating them. "This is the worst case scenario you're going to have to deal with. Many, many other storms that come along are not going to be like this." We're seeing better technology, we're seeing excellent forecasters at the Hurricane Center use these tools, passing the information on to us, and then we share it with the Emergency Management team. We have a hurricane liaison team down at the Hurricane Center, made up of emergency managers, and FEMA, and Homeland Security personnel. So you let the people know the worst case scenario. And they've asked me many times, "What would it look like?" And if you saw Biloxi, Mississippi, that was a storm surge attack. If you look at New Orleans, that was the wind and a little bit of what happened when the levies broke.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: What's Atlantic City going to look like in a Category 3?

MR. EBERWINE: It will look like Biloxi, Mississippi.

A lot of those buildings are not storm tested.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Describe that for the people who are writing for the newspapers. Describe a little bit of what that would look like.

MR. EBERWINE: What it would look like?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes.

MR. EBERWINE: You would have--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: What's the Trop going to look like? I don't want to pick on a particular building. But what are these casinos that are right along the boardwalk -- what are they going to look like?

MR. EBERWINE: Category 3 -- you're looking at a 12- to 16-foot storm surge -- 18 feet. Now you're taking into account if it comes at high tide, so you add another six feet, which is the tidal range along the shore. So now you're up to 23, 24 feet. Category 3 -- you now have tremendous wave action on top of that, which is actually going to be the destruction of the building itself. You'll have-- The surge will come in. It will be able to support higher water, it will be able to support the waves that are going to be breaking on the structures. And just about every building is going to be destroyed or have a tremendous amount of damage to it.

MS. LECKNER: Along with the sewage treatment plant.

MR. EBERWINE: Yes, it will just be overwhelming. And, again, you want to know how the public reacts to this.

There were two instances that took place at the Jersey Shore over a period of, I think, three years. One was: Atlantic City lost their water source a couple of years ago, and they had to run a line to Brigantine. Well, what caught my attention was how the people reacted. The people were furious that they didn't have drinking water. They were furious they didn't have anything for showers.

Then we had some roving blackouts down in, I think, Avalon a few years before that. July 4th it reached a hundred degrees. Look at the reaction of the people, and then magnify that over 8.5 million people. It's a mind-boggling concept to think of what could happen in the Northeast here. And it's overwhelming. It would be overwhelming.

MR. KEMPF: Which I believe goes to punctuate the reasons why we need to get to the people. All the destruction -- that kind of stuff -- is the nasty that we get to see afterward. But we don't want the people in that. We can replace the houses, we can replace the roads and bridges. Yes, at a great expense and long time. But the key mission that we have to have here must be the focus on the people. We have to find a way to get them out of there, to get their attention to understand the types of things that Jim is talking about, so we don't have to dig them out of the rubble.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I agree. And hopefully that's one of the work products of this Task Force.

MR. V. JONES: The other thing, too, is, statutorily, the problem that we've had is -- and I hate to bring it up -- but like with the casinos, we can tell them they've got to go, we can tell them they've got to close, we can tell them, "Don't put people on the upper floors," but, again,

it's us just simply telling them. You can throw the word *orders* around, but there's nothing that says they have to do it.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Where does the authority come? Where does the actual authority come to evacuate, to force them?

MR. V. JONES: Local municipal coordinators can do it. We can do it on the county level. The State can do it.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: But we can't force them out?

MS. LECKNER: You can actually-- You can shut down the gambling by pulling the Commission. But to shut down the business, the Governor would have to actually make that order. And everybody is, like, politically, would he do that? He would not, because any business may still have people in it during an event. It's a hotel at that point. To shut down the gambling is simple. To make sure people--

MR. V. JONES: Which we've done. The gambling, unfortunately-- When the State shut down, we did it. And we have a plan to do that. But like she said, it becomes just a bunch of high-rise hotels. And they can basically -- which they've done in the past -- see yourself at the door.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: That's true for any business, I would assume.

MR. V. JONES: Absolutely.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Is there anything we should do with that?

MR. V. JONES: And I hate to-- Now that becomes a--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Are there states that have better models for that?

MR. V. JONES: There's statutes. I mean, some states have some, but it's a--

I don't know. If somebody wants to throw themselves out there to try to develop statutes, I mean--

MR. KEMPF: Exactly. You need to put more teeth into the declaration process by the Governor -- that when the casinos are told that they must close, they must evacuate people, not bring them and put them in higher rooms. That's the type of thing you need.

The reason I'm kind of chomping at the bit-- You can see the fellow to my right here jumping around. His name is Mike Beeman. He is part of my staff. He is the National Preparedness Director for Region II. In addition, Mike was the coordinator for the activities in Biloxi, Mississippi. And, coincidentally, he was in Minneapolis last week, when the bridge collapsed.

So I would like to just give you a moment with Mike, because I think he has some insights that would be very beneficial.

MR. V. JONES: I was going to say, things start to follow him. Is that what you're saying? (laughter)

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I'm getting a little nervous.

**M I C H A E L B E E M A N:** First and foremost, do not leave this room until you know the routes out of the area.

But I will tell you, I was set down in front of Katrina, into Biloxi, Mississippi. And the reason was, the emergency manager down there didn't even start his job until the 29th of August, the day the storm blew in. And so they had some huge challenges. The Mayor had only been on the job in Gulf Port for three months. The Mayor of Biloxi, A.J. Holloway, was

extremely well-versed. He'd married up and stayed in constant communication with the Mayor of Charleston, South Carolina, so that he'd fully understand. He bought himself catastrophic insurance and all that, really put himself in good shape after the event.

But there are so many questions you have, and so many times I wanted to-- I was sitting there biting my lip. The challenges you have here in New Jersey are going to be much like they were in Mississippi. All right? What you're going to have in the northern part -- while it's similar to what he pointed out with what occurred in New Orleans -- is a bit different. They had a secondary event that caused the levies to collapse and cause the flooding that they had.

But let's go straight to the subject of Mississippi. The biggest problem there was complacency, as Steve pointed out already. Two hundred eighty people lost their lives because they didn't follow the directions to leave the coastal and the low-lying areas. You don't have to move the total population. Most of it was population that was affected within the first quarter-mile to half-mile of the coastal area, and those areas where there were tributaries inland. Because when the storm surge came, they were expecting -- we were expecting 18 to 22 feet. It came in at 25 to 32 feet. And it came into the back bays and stayed at that elevation 10 miles inland, to I-10, and actually deposited debris into the middle of I-10 and blocked the roadway. So you had tremendous challenges of secondary evacuation, people who wanted to leave afterwards, and the people trying to come back in.

So the biggest thing is getting people to understand what can happen in the event and what the challenges will be, and identifying that

population that needs to move. Not everybody needs to move, all right? And that's what you're going to be challenged with as soon as you say, "We have an event." And that shadow evacuation that goes "Lord, are we going to be like we were in New Orleans?" and they all leave. And you end up with a saturation of the system, because there are so many people trying to get out of the area that don't need to leave.

Now, to the subject of the casinos, we did shut the casinos down. I sat in that EOC, and we did shut the casinos down. But there's a difference. Their casinos down there are -- had to be on the water. They were on barges and, as such, were floating on the Gulf of Mexico. Most of those barges, afterwards, were a mile-and-a-half inland -- down the coastal area and a quarter-mile inland -- were deposited across. These barges are over two blocks long and six stories tall. So that gives you some idea of the intensity of one of these events. But in the first quarter-mile of that coastal area -- 26 miles across Harrison County -- nothing remained except concrete slabs. There was nothing there except that. And that's probably what you were seeing when you went down there.

And I will give you an example. One casino -- the Hard Rock Café -- had not even been turned over from the contractor to the owner. And it took the brunt, full force, of this event. Destruction to the third floor, and the garage area to the third floor was completely -- it was debris and completely destroyed on those lower levels. So if you leave opportunity for a population to stay in those facilities, and they do, the challenge is getting them out of there afterwards. And I will tell you, sitting there listening -- and you don't want to do this, sir -- listening to the 9-1-1 calls that come in during the middle of the event, of people crying that they're

floating, they're stuck, and they need somebody to come and rescue them right then-- You can't do it. And the population needs to understand that -- that they cannot leave after that point in time. As you pointed out, once those winds start, you just don't do anything after that. Everybody hunkers down. Even the police force has to do something to protect themselves.

So there are lots of questions I'm sure you have. And I'd be happy to try and answer anything.

MR. KEMPF: From my perspective, emergency management has learned from Katrina -- learned dramatically. Certainly FEMA has. Some of the things that we have worked with the State to do -- and we call it *leaning forward* -- preparing commodities for immediate use into the state, of all counties. You brought up a point earlier about what if storms hit up the coast? You know, a multitude of states were working on plans and have plans in place to distribute commodities as they're necessary all along that coast.

We're addressing this. It comes right back, again -- and I hate to harp on it, sir -- but it really is vital that we have to get to the people. We have to move them out of harm's way. We can clean up the rest. We can't replace a life. And that is the key to all of the work that each of us does.

MR. BEEMAN: I do want to make two additional points. One, after the event, you have to be concerned, as we ultimately, very quickly learned -- is that you have to worry about a secondary event. After Katrina, Hurricane Rita came into the Gulf. And as such, the biggest challenge we had was assuring that we could move a population that already had been hard-hit. So making sure buses were full of fuel and all that --

that we could take, now, a very transportation-dependent population and move them out. Because a lot of people had no fuel. Immediately after the storm, they jumped in their gigantic SUVs, sucking down about six miles to the gallon, and running out of gas in areas that had no gas. And it made no sense. “Why are you getting on the road? Why are you driving around? What is the reason to be out touring around the damaged areas?”

MR. KEMPF: Can I just interrupt you right there?

One of the things that I know each of our county plans has is accommodations to provide both wrecker-towing service along the evacuation routes to keep people moving effectively, having adequate fuel supplies along those routes for not just the evacuees but also for emergency equipment.

Ocean County, just a couple of short months ago -- with the forest fires up there-- Actually, it turned out to be a good exercise to demonstrate how you can move all that massive equipment, keep them fueled, keep them coordinated, keep them moving. I don't mean to go off on it, but Ocean County did a remarkable job on that. And I think that a lot of the other counties have the same type of plans and were probably looking at Ocean County to see how it worked so that they can go ahead and polish their plans as Ocean County would. And I'm sure it found some little things to tweak.

But those are the bright spots. Those are the things that we have a lot of confidence in that the State of New Jersey can do. And these are all coordinated down through the Office of Emergency Management in the State.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: How can we do better in New Jersey?

MR. BEEMAN: I'll tell you what would scare me the most, right at this point in time, to be honest with you -- it's not understanding all the various parts from the standpoint of the state of New York, the State of New Jersey, the state of Pennsylvania, the state of Rhode Island; and what all of them are doing to deconflict any types of arrangements they're making on evacuation of populations. Because as you suddenly try to move the most densely populated area of the United States, all seeing an event coming up off the coast of North Carolina and, in some case, with less than 12 hours to do something, getting on the roadway -- Long Island alone, trying to move their population off and trying to go through New York City, into the State of New Jersey. And then the saturation of the road system-- I think there needs to be a lot more done with the connectivity and the discussions of all of those emergency plans for evacuation. And as you talk to the public, reassuring them that not all the population needs to move. That's why we have this modeling -- is to make sure that the decision process, as such, is well educated, that you are making the proper decisions in advance of the storm, and not causing the panic to where everybody wants to get on the roadways.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: That, of course, depends on where you are. In some counties that's true. In Cape May, if it's a real bad storm -- a Category 3 -- almost everybody does have to move. That's a separate thing.

MR. KEMPF: Yes, in Cape May you'd be kind of almost like the exception to the rule, because of its geographic location. Absolutely, sir.

MR. McCALL: Jeff.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes.

MR. McCALL: If I may.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes, Mr. McCall.

MR. McCALL: Thank you, Assemblyman.

One of the things that we look at in Cape May County-- The evacuation is important. And we've said, in Cape May County, that there are no shelters in Cape May County for Category 1 or greater hurricanes. So the evacuation process is very, very important to get people out.

Understanding-- And discount -- and take away all the economic stuff, and let's just concentrate on the public safety aspect. We want everybody out of Cape May County for two reason: one, for the storm surge. Okay? And the SLOSH modeling does not take into consideration tidal events; it does not take into consideration the rainfall that comes with that; it does not take into consideration the wind shear. In a good Northeast storm, or a good summertime lightening and thunderstorm with a good wind, we'll lose 28,000 homes -- 22,000 homes -- electricity. When we get off the barrier islands, and we get into the areas that are "safe" in Cape May County, away from the storm surge, we've been told by the electricity provider -- Atlantic City Electric, currently -- that on a Category 1 storm, their belief is that -- and it's not a knock on the Conectiv or Atlantic City Electric, it's just a function of the system -- that Cape May County can be without electricity for a minimum of one week.

So when we talk about not having shelters in Cape May County, we don't want to put somebody someplace who, after the event has gone by -- and the storm surge is out, and the tide recedes -- who is not

going to be able to survive without electricity. And in the offshore areas, there are wet wells. They're all run by electricity. Most people do not have generators in their homes. The septic systems are probably going to be flooded because of the creeks rising -- the rainstorm. And if the storm surge gets there-- If we're talking 10 miles, on both sides of the county, we're talking the entire county of Cape May.

So when people ask us about sheltering in Cape May County, I say we have none. The reason is twofold. It's on the front end, and it's on the return. A couple of folks mentioned, people want to come back in a hurry to see their homes. Forget they may not have homes. But even if their home does survive, and they're out someplace on the mainland, they may not be able to occupy that house for a lack of electricity.

So when-- We would really-- We try to take it to the extreme and say everybody has got to leave -- that's what we'll tell them. But the reason we're suggesting that is because it's not going to be pleasant to come back into Cape May County if we have this kind of an event. The sewer plants on the barrier islands, the sewer plant for Avalon, sits on the mainland. There are 23 pumping stations between each of the barrier island communities that pump out to the sewer plant. If they're inundated with salt water, if they're filled with sand, that sewer plant may not get opened for two weeks. So it's all of the infrastructure that allows for people to live their normal life -- becomes affected with an evacuation, and that calls for everyone to leave, because you may not be able to exist for a two-week period afterwards.

MR. BEEMAN: If I might.

MR. McCALL: Yes.

MR. BEEMAN: You made-- All of those were issues in Mississippi. I will tell you that everything from the sewer plants, to the water plants, to the fact that we had people in shelters as much as 60 days or more -- because they had no home to go back to, even from -- those that weren't even necessarily from the water surge. But the wind fields from Katrina covered 81 of 82 counties in Mississippi. The destruction path of the winds was tremendous.

But what you're talking about became a huge challenge, and would even be more so in the Northeast, because you've got to worry about temperate change. After the storm passes here, you don't have the ability for people to live in tent cities or something else of that nature. So you have some-- Everything you pointed out were challenges to us in Mississippi -- huge challenges.

MR. KEMPF: You may-- Instead of water and ice, you may be going to blankets and heaters.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: In some ways we're in better shape, but in other -- because of some sophistication that they may not have had. But in other ways, because of population density and other weather issues, we're actually in worse shape.

MR. BEEMAN: It depends on which thing you want to take there. Because the challenges that -- which you have on the sewer treatment plants and the water treatment plants-- Many times, the circuitry of those things is very elaborate. And as such, if you have them preidentified-- Where you're going to be able to get those circuitries from -- can take you weeks, if not months, to get the replacement circuitry.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Do we have that?

MR. BEEMAN: Okay?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Do we have that preidentification?

MR. BEEMAN: Now, the challenge-- Because some of these are very--

When you get inundated with salt water -- and every one of those lift stations for the plants -- for the water lift stations -- had a special type of circuitry. And it turned out that of the 26 lift stations, not many of them had similar types of circuitry boards. And once you put the salt water in, it destroys the boards, and you have to replace the boards. One of those lift stations was brand new and had to be completely rebuilt because of the inundation of the salt water into the system. In addition, when the pipes fill with the sand and all that, you end up with another problem -- that you have to clear all that, even before you start pumping anything through the system.

In a place called Pass Christian, and the next town over -- I'll remember it in a second. Both of those, as such -- when I left 85 days later -- still had not been able to open parts because of the sewer systems filled with sand and because the circuitry boards had not been replaced on the systems.

MR. KEMPF: If I can add to that? I don't sit and read all the county plans page for page, sentence for sentence, but I do believe that the county plan -- I know in Ocean County it does, because that's where I live, sir -- but I believe that the other counties do, as well-- Under the respective public works departments, I think there is an annex within most of the

plans -- or somewhere within that plan -- that charges the director of public works to address, specifically, that issue.

Am I-- I don't know if I'm 100 percent correct on all the counties, but I think most of them--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Joe, you could address--

MR. SEVER: Generally.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And I also wanted to ask you, too, after you're done addressing that-- We're talking about shelters. Do you feel we have enough in Cumberland County for all the folks that are going to pour out of the other areas?

MR. SEVER: No. That's an easy question. No, we don't. Because you could be -- based on the time of day, any time of year -- if you're (indiscernible) in August, and you're looking at, say, 10 percent of the population needs to be sheltered, and you're going to evacuate 400,000 people, we could look at 40,000 people needing sheltering. It's a possibility.

MR. BEEMAN: There were towns in Mississippi that may have been 20,000 -- 18,000 to 20,000 before the storm. After the storm, in some cases, they were 45,000 and 50,000 in the population in those communities, that fast. Because the population moved and ended up in those communities.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: So the issue in a place like Cumberland County is how they're going to deal with all the influx of the increased population.

MR. BEEMAN: And then, once you've moved them out, until Rick Arroyo, and the State, and the communities say, "We can bring them

back in,” you’ll end up with a huge challenge of being able to bring them back in. We couldn’t bring them back into Mississippi, because there was no place to put them. There were no hotels available. All of those were taken up by contractors and people that had been smart enough to get in before the storm rolled in.

So there will be a huge challenge with that, the responder communities. You’re going to end up with probably 30,000 or 40,000 people trying to come into the area to help you -- places to put them. The power companies, the large contingent of them; the area to put 500 or 600 electrical trucks, the power crews to come in -- the hundreds of them -- 700, or 800, or more.

MR. KEMPF: And these are all prestaged.

MR. BEEMAN: This all has to be elaborately choreographed. Okay?

MR. SEVER: And you’re going to look at a county like Cumberland, or Gloucester, or Camden, who end up being the staging areas for a lot of the functions that are going to take place on the coastline, because of the problems of getting into those areas.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Are you prepared for that?

MR. SEVER: Somewhat. I couldn’t say--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Truthfully.

MR. SEVER: Truthfully, I could say maybe we could handle 10 or 20 percent of the issues, but that would be it.

MS. LECKNER: Assemblyman.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes.

MS. LECKNER: I'd like to make just a comment on the critical infrastructure. Because the question about the water plants -- and I don't know if Major Arroyo--

I know you actually were in Special Ops. I don't know-- The Special Ops at the State Police does critical infrastructure planning. Whether or not they've done this type -- with the hurricane. I know they've done terrorism, and they have extensive plans, and very well developed.

But it might be something to bring to them, or perhaps have somebody represented later from Special Ops.

The other thing, with the generators, and with electric, and all that, it might be worthwhile to have somebody from the Board of Public Utilities -- James Giuliano -- perhaps come in, as well as the Army Corps of Engineers. There's a woman named Micky Mulvenna. And they do have a generator program, as well, for disaster.

MR. BEEMAN: And you should be preidentifying all -- this is what we've been preaching a lot nowadays -- is knowing where your critical infrastructure is, that you need to have backup power. Then you also need to figure out what that currency of those systems are. In other words, if it's a generator, it's 500 kilowatts that's on that hospital or whatever -- that if it goes off-line, what it is you're going to need to replace it, and all of that. There's a lot there.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: So we really -- if we were doing a good job on this Task Force -- should be talking with our major utilities, should be talking--

MR. BEEMAN: Not necessarily. It is the organizations that are going to have the power generators -- the hospitals, your emergency-- You're going to decide -- let's say, Cumberland County, for example -- that the wind field destroys -- all the power lines are going to take-- In Mississippi, it took us 60 days or more to get most of the county back onto power. If you're without power, you end up with a population that is surging into Cumberland County. Preidentify all locations, making sure you have power generation on them, but then to be able to identify, if that power generation goes off-line, what it is you're going to be asking for the State and Federal government to bring in to replace that generator.

MS. LECKNER: And for the State, the Board of Public Utilities would be the link to that. They would be in charge of that, and the EOC -- and the State EOC.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: We can definitely get-- We can even ask Jeanne Fox, and make sure that we can connect with her, and make sure we find out exactly how that works.

MR. BEEMAN: If I could, the biggest challenge afterwards is having people understand how to write a scope so that we can write a mission assignment. You don't stand up on national television and say, "Send the Federal government." You say, "I want to move 500 people 48,000 miles within 48 hours."

MR. KEMPF: To accomplish what?

MR. BEEMAN: To accomplish what? To move that--

It is very clear. You need 20 generators, 500 kilowatts, in Cumberland County. That's a clear definement of the scope of what you're asking for. A little more -- we want the definition of what the generator

requirements are. There is some phasing, and all that. But that is the biggest--

One of the biggest challenges that occurred in Katrina, in both Louisiana and Mississippi, is the understanding of how to ask the Federal government and what you're asking for. Because a lot of it won't be coming from the Federal government after the event. It will be coming from EMAC. But if you have a prelandfall declaration that you've asked for, through the Federal government, we can start staging stuff in, in advance of the storm, as far in advance as the President has signed that prelandfall declaration. But there are some very clear lines there as to what constitutes--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And they weren't able to do that. They were not ready.

MR. BEEMAN: That was not the previous stand. It is now.

MR. KEMPF: It was a lesson learned. And that's one of the things we do now, in fact, working with Major Arroyo and his officers to do exactly those types of things, and how to write mission assignments, what the keys are. And those, I think, have been discussed with the counties, or will be discussed with the counties.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And we're getting more ready.

Cumberland County -- is it just from lack of infrastructure -- there just aren't the buildings for these people? Or is it that we haven't identified them?

MR. SEVER: Well, there's a lot of things involved in it, too. Because when you go out, you just can't arbitrarily pick a building. The building has to meet the wind loads, and it has to have the capabilities of

handling the people. And you're talking about anywhere from the water system, sewer system, refrigeration, food service. All that has to be taken into consideration before you go out and just pick a site.

MR. KEMPF: Can't be in the flood plain.

MR. SEVER: Because I could go down the road and say, "Well, there's 10 warehouses we could use." But will they be structurally sound?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Are we going through that process, Joe?

MR. SEVER: We are hopefully going to start that process in Cumberland, because we've been able to access some Homeland Security funds to do that. But that's a very difficult project. And to get someone to come out and certify wind load is a very difficult project, too, because that takes a licensed person to do that -- to give you a really accurate wind load of a building and tell you what to do.

But when we're talking about this, we're also talking about what we're going to do with the people, what we're going to do with the government itself. The government is a key to anything. If you don't have the government in place and operational, and the people want to come back, how are you going to get them to do the functions of the government? You can't reinhabitate a place if you don't have it inspected. You can't reinhabitate a place if you don't have the health department to advise you if it's safe, or the water is safe, and all that kind of stuff. And that's all continuity of government, continuity of operation.

MR. BEEMAN: And that's some of what we're pushing.

MR. SEVER: That is just as important. Because if you have damage to your community, and your employees are taking care of their properties, you also need to backfill those slots in your government to be able to provide the service to the people when they get back. And that's key.

MR. BEEMAN: And that happened in Mississippi many times. We'd go to find an employee that was responsible for this action, and we'd go, and they'd say, "We can bring Charlie in tomorrow morning at 8:00." And the next morning, at 8:00, I'd go, "Where's Charlie?" And they'd go, "We don't know. We haven't found him." I said, "What, did you preidentify him prior to the storm?" "Well, I thought we told him he was mission essential." I said, "Was it, in your structure, identified as mission essential -- emergency essential?" We finally found that person -- was in Las Vegas. And when we got a hold of the person -- "Did you know you were emergency essential?" "No." And they just left.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: So one of the things that -- in our recommendations -- again, when that final book comes out of this -- would be to preidentify both structural and personnel issues that need to be taken care of.

MR. BEEMAN: We'll help you with that even. We have a team that works for us -- works for me, actually -- in continuity government -- COG and COO -- continuity operations. And we are now pushed, under presidential directive, to start working more with the states and locals. We'll work with Rick on any of those sorts of issues you want. But it is one that, after Katrina, became one of the primary, essential functions identified

by the President and all the structure in Washington -- is the continuation of our form of government -- is almost the first essential function.

So what this gentleman has said is supposed to be one of our foremost actions that we take in any event, is being able to reconstitute the government actions and to make sure that we have enough operational personnel to do what we need to do for that population.

MR. KEMPF: How do you sustain for the long-term? You burn people out in 72 hours, you need to have reinforcements, so to speak, to come in. That's the continuity of operations -- keeping those people there so whatever it is you've launched into to help the people will continue and not just fall apart, because the people are falling apart after 72 hours, number one.

With that, though, I wanted to just address, very briefly, something that Colonel Devery brought up. He will be meeting with my Region II Defense Coordinating Officer at DCO. This is the individual who reports to me, who coordinates all the military resources that may be required. And he has been out doing just a phenomenal job throughout the state, working a lot primarily on communications. Because, as somebody mentioned, that has been a big issue in the State of New Jersey. But he is also meeting with folks like Colonel Devery to advise them and keep him informed as to just what types of resources the DCO will bring to the table, both pre-event and post-event. So that will be made known to -- if you will -- to the Colonel.

I think you have the meeting this week.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER FROM AUDIENCE: Oh, absolutely.

MR. KEMPF: This week it is.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER FROM AUDIENCE: And  
(indiscernible) met with the State Police.

MR. KEMPF: I know it's a very short-term. Yes.

Everything that we do is-- We always work through the Office of Emergency Management, because that's what-- It really is the backbone of emergency management -- is the relationships that develop between each of our respective responsibilities.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you.

Questions?

Vince.

MR. V. JONES: Again, the knowledge, the relationships, and stuff that we have in place-- The players are there. I mean, it's just a matter of getting the people on the outside to, again, buy into it, heed the warning, do certain things.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Where do they go in Atlantic? Hammonton? They go just to western Atlantic County?

MR. V. JONES: They go as far west as need be, depending on, again, the winds and stuff. I mean, it's not just that wall. We want to get, obviously, the people away from that wall of water. But we have to look at the flooding, we have to look at the winds. I mean, Philadelphia is just a little over 60 miles away, and I know there is going to be wind damage in Philly if we ever do get a storm that makes landfall. So they'll be safe from the water but maybe not the winds. So, like Frank said, with the outages and stuff-- There's a lot that goes into it.

The other problem is, we rely heavily -- as does the Red Cross -- when you start talking about the sheltering issue, we rely on volunteers. Well, these volunteers, again, are going to be evacuating and leaving with their families. And so the people that we count on during the noncritical times are not going to be there. So there's a lot-- Some agencies are going to, unfortunately, fall short, and they're going to need some assistance. It's after the fact we're going to be playing catch-up. And that's where a lot of our problems, I think, are going to occur.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Mariana.

MS. LECKNER: My soapbox is public outreach, so I'm so happy to hear you say that. And I think if people don't know what's expected of them, they're not going to do what you want. They're going to do whatever they want. And it's not going to be the same.

One other thing that we haven't really addressed in the evacuation, which doesn't apply to zones, is manufactured housing -- and whether that's RV parks, trailer parks, any type of structure in those sorts of parks, as well as tents, campgrounds -- which you have in Cape May and everywhere statewide we have to be evacuated.

Mike, EDIS in the south-- We don't use EDIS up north. Does that work for interstate communication? What's your experience with that? We rely on TRANSCOM. Comments?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Explain the question you're asking?

MS. LECKNER: We, in the tri-state area-- We use a company called TRANSCOM that updates us on traffic so that interstate we can see what's going on. Snowstorms, ice storms, stuff like that -- works great.

We've seen it work. We use it effectively. From Maryland, south, I believe it is -- they use a program called EDIS, which actually will show you interstate travel so that each state can see where people are moving from one state into theirs, and where their people are going. So we don't have a visual picture in New Jersey, between New Jersey and New York. We have a list of -- these bridges are closed, this is happening, traffic is backed up here. It's written out. We don't have, sort of, the GIS-based system.

And I'm wondering how well it works.

MR. BEEMAN: And I'll tell you right now. In fact, strangely enough, part of the gap analysis issue is-- Once we understand the gap, how do we close the gap? So part of that is the GIS element, which-- Not a lot of people are familiar with all the subsets in the GIS, and what they can do.

In fact, my brother, who lives in Colorado, is one of the original mathematics equation gurus for GIS. And he is coming to FEMA's headquarters to help try and find ways to do some of the stuff you're talking about. Because as you're trying to figure out -- to bring materials in -- you have to understand what the saturation of the road system may be with those evacuations, secondary evacuations, everything that's going to happen, and the debris that's in the road, and the bridges such as the one I had last week in Minnesota. You will have roads that will close, because the roadways will collapse. It did in Mississippi. Harrison County, bridges collapsed, gone completely -- changed the transit time for medical from 30 minutes response time to two hours and 45 minutes to get to a Trauma I facility, which is far beyond what you want to have for a Trauma I response. So we actually put-- I physically requested we got a helicopter placed in that county to do nothing but handle medical situations and issues. It was

one of the ones requested under the mission assignment. We got one, it stayed there.

But understanding what's available in GIS is extremely important -- and how it can help you in the decision process. And what you're talking about is something that probably really needs to be done in the Northeast more than anywhere else, so is to understand--

MS. LECKNER: Did they use it with -- especially between Louisiana and Mississippi, where they kind of had that fight on the border? Did it--

MR. BEEMAN: Well, to be honest with you, by the time I got in there -- and on evacuations -- and just to give you some insight to the thing-- When I drove the distance from Mobile, Alabama to Biloxi -- about 60 miles inland -- I watched the last of the evacuating population out of Louisiana and Mississippi in my rearview mirror five miles out. I was the only vehicle on I-10 heading west for the hour-and-a-half, two hours. And I thank God for GIS, because I couldn't see the road most of the time through the feeder bands. And I want to tell you, that was over 12 -- 13, 14, 15 hours before the storm made landfall that I was stuck out in those feeder bands trying to get across I-10, with water up to almost half way to my knees in some cases. So you don't want to be out in that event, let me tell you. Once that decision has been made -- hunker down and staying -- that's what you do.

This is an experience, to go back to your point earlier, about flying debris. I was one of those who was stupid enough to go out when the debris was flying and ended up getting my glasses broken in half by

something hitting me in the face. And that was still 12 -- 13 hours before the landfall of the event.

MR. KEMPF: Mike is our answer to the Weather Channel's Jim Cantore. (laughter)

MR. BEEMAN: In fact, I was looking for Jim at the time that I got my glasses broken.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Were you scared?

MR. BEEMAN: No, I wasn't scared. The problem was, afterwards, I looked more like a geek and stupid, because I didn't have any way to fix my glasses. I was using Band-Aids. (laughter)

But this also-- Now, this is something to think about. This was where it was very helpful for the community to understand what is available to them in the private sector. Because one of the county commissioners looked at me and said, "We can fix this problem. I know Charlie Smith, who owns the optical shop." Police went and drove him -- got that guy, brought him in. He went and fixed my glasses, and I was back in business about seven hours after the event. But knowing what's available in your private sector is extremely important.

MR. KEMPF: And that's something that I have so much confidence in New Jersey about -- is that these county coordinators, and certainly the local coordinators, have that insight and relationships throughout their respective jurisdictions. And it is that kind of thing that is going to make it work. We could have all the plans, all the basics; and when you get through it, it's kind of like what Wayne said. We all know the major highways, but these guys know the back roads -- and not just in travel, trust me. They have all the resources at their fingertips to do these

types of things. And that's part of the gap analysis that we talked about -- is to understand just what it is that people are going to need for putting their lives back together.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I agree with you. I just think, in a very major event, how it's going to all interact is going to be the real question and where the real problem is going to be.

I think, individually, in -- whether it's Avalon, or Atlantic City, or Long Beach Island, I think those folks really do know their people, and they're going to know what to do -- all those little pieces. But it's getting all the little pieces coordinated into the big, major piece of getting everybody out, everybody having a place to stay that's safe and secure, having whatever they need to take care of them all there, and then bringing everybody else back in to fix the devastation. And getting them out quickly enough -- that people really listen. It's all things that you've already said, though.

Wayne, what do you have? Anything?

MR. RUPERT: Everything has been pretty well said, I think.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay, good.

Frank, you were good.

Joe, I think you were good.

Any other questions -- anybody -- for these gentlemen? (no response)

Okay. Thank you for being here.

MR. KEMPF: You're very welcome. Thank you, again, for the opportunity.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Hope you stay for a few minutes.

You're welcome.

MR. KEMPF: Yes, we will.

And I just want to reiterate our offer to work through the State OEM to provide you that information so that we can help deliver that picture to the people.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Good. We would like that.

MR. KEMPF: And Mariana and I have talked about it many times. So we're on the same page.

Thank you, sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: We would like to do it.

Thank you.

MR. BEEMAN: I'm not leaving permanently, but I do need to take a break. (laughter)

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay.

Ms. Heidi Hoppe from the U.S. Geological Survey.

And for everybody, it's been long. We just -- like, literally, five minutes -- we're going to take a five-minute recess. There is coffee, juice, and snacks in the cafeteria.

These guys -- they are prepared here in Atlantic County.

**(RECESS)**

**AFTER RECESS:**

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: We're going to reconvene this meeting, just for a few moments.

And we're actually going to have a meeting in Trenton, at the ROIC, to actually explore many of these issues that deal with the New Jersey State Police and the State Office of Emergency Management.

But we are fortunate to have Major Richard Arroyo with us, as well. He is the Commanding Officer. And I know he had a few comments he'd like to make, as well.

**MAJOR RICHARD ARROYO:** The only thing I'd like to do is invite the committee to the ROIC, the Regional Operation Intelligence Center up in West Trenton. That's actually the command center, any emergency that happens. And we're discussing hurricanes right now. So that's actually the brains of the State of New Jersey.

All the partners will have a say at the table.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Because we knew it wasn't the Legislature, for God's sake. (laughter)

MAJOR ARROYO: We're talking only emergencies here, sir.

All of our partners have a spot at the table.

I'd like the committee to see the actual facility and to get a feel of exactly what happens.

All the partners are there. A decision isn't made by one person. It's made by-- As Mariana has said, there's probably 70 to 75 people on conference calls, in the building -- five days out, where we start the process. And, again, the State works very well with all the partners: with FEMA, with the Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, DMAVA, the county coordinators.

Hey, there's always room for improvement. And I will tell you what: our doors are open. We'll let you review anything you'd like. I'd welcome it, to tell you the truth. I do want to tell you that I'm confident that if a storm were to hit, we're far -- we exceed what Mississippi and Louisiana were at, at the particular time of their emergency.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Good.

Well, I appreciate you being here, Rich. And we are -- we're going to have a meeting up there at the ROIC. That will be one of the meetings we'll have. We're also going to have a meeting for the Salem-Cumberland region, as well, and then finally a meeting in the Monmouth-Ocean-Middlesex area. Those are going to be the next three meetings we're going to have. And, hopefully, that should wrap it up for this Task Force. But we do appreciate--

And by the way -- just so everybody knows -- the function of this Task Force is not to find fault, not to say that anything isn't being done well. Because I think we can be very proud of what we're doing in New Jersey and proud of what the State is doing. We want to be the best. For all the criticism that there is of this state, very often, in many ways we are the best at a great deal of what we do. And we want to make sure that we are with this. Because we are a very vulnerable state. And right now we're in a particularly vulnerable region, where we're having this hearing. We just want to make sure we're doing everything possible, the right way.

MAJOR ARROYO: And, sir, I never thought that you were trying to find fault. We're trying to improve. And the State's constantly trying to improve. And I really mean that. We welcome that.

There's things that the State itself is doing that other states haven't. Again, that private-public partnership-- We've got individuals, right now, working what we call the RDDB. It's a database where we're bringing in-- It's 80 percent populated, right now, with State resources. So all the State resources -- when you speak about equipment and generators, we know exactly where that is. We may be close to 100 percent now. It was only about two weeks ago we were at 80 percent. We're now bringing the public -- the private partners on board. Private -- we had about 55 percent completed. So at a time of emergency, we're going to know where those generators are.

FEMA has done a gap analysis, and they actually led the way. We're now doing a State gap analysis, as you heard the Director and the assistants give testimony -- that they actually realize it's not just going to be New Jersey that gets hit by a hurricane. There's going to be six to eight states that are going to be involved with that. And Region II is going to have to split up the resources. New Jersey is aware of that, and we're going to have to share our resources.

Again, we were talking during the break-- We're set for the commodities. You've got to be prepared to save the lives prior to the event, but now we have to go into the recovery mode. We have plans for the generators so we have fuel on board. We can get fuel, we can come back up as quickly as possible. Our grocery stores-- Again, as Mike had stated, water treatment plants, sewage plants -- all this is being identified, right now, so we can come back to the recovery stage -- with the debris.

There are so many things going on, I could sit up here for an hour. And I really don't want to take that time.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: No, we're going to look forward to it. We're really going to go through a thorough analysis with you when we're up at the ROIC. And we thank you for the invitation. And we will be there.

MAJOR ARROYO: Thank you very much.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you for being here today.

Alrighty, we left off-- We're going to actually have Heidi Hoppe, from the U.S. Geological Survey.

**HEIDI L. HOPPE:** I'd like to thank you for the invitation to come down here to give you a little bit of overview of what we are -- what the USGS is providing.

As was said, my name is Heidi Hoppe. I'm the Project Chief for the New Jersey Tide Telemetry System, which is part of the U.S. Geological Survey, New Jersey Water Science Center.

Also, Rick Kropp, our Director of the Water Science Center, came down with me. And I invite you to interlude anytime.

The New Jersey Tide Telemetry System is just one of six flood warning systems that we operate -- that the USGS operates in the state. The first one being the Pascack, which you can kind of see up in the top part of the state. That's one of our flood warning systems. We have the Passaic Flood Warning System that we operate with the National Weather Service. The Raritan Flood Warning -- I'm sorry, the Rahway Flood Warning System; the Somerset County Flood Warning (*sic*) System; Burlington County, which is our newest flood warning system; and then the

New Jersey Tide Telemetry System, which runs pretty much from Hackensack, all down the coast, up the bay, pretty much to Trenton.

The mission of our flood warning systems: Our goal is to provide real-time, hydrologic and meteorological data to our cooperators in the National Weather Service, so that the National Weather Service can develop timely and accurate flood forecasts which assist the county and municipal agencies in planning flood preparation and also emergency evacuation procedures.

A little bit of the history of the Tide Telemetry System: As I'm sure all of you know, being in the field that we're all in, we've had numerous catastrophic storms. We've talked a little bit about history -- of recent history -- what's gone on. But these are some of the major storms that have hit New Jersey.

After these storms, the National Weather Service reported that there was a need for not only ocean information for tidal information, but back bay information. We didn't really have a whole lot of information on coastal flood events in the back bays. So initial interest for planning a system in the back bays started to come about in December 1992. That was very nicely followed up by the great Nor'easter of December 11, 1992, which sort of solidified the planning of the system. And that's when they decided that the New Jersey Department of Transportation and the USGS enter into a cooperative agreement to plan, design, and implement a New Jersey Tide Telemetry System. Funded work began in 1994, and the initial completion was in 1997. The USGS continues to lead the operations, and maintenance, and coordination of the system.

The purpose of the Tide Telemetry System was for accurate back bay water-level and weather data, to provide real-time data availability for our decision makers and also the general public. And then we also provide long-term data archival for designing, planning, and hazard assessment after the fact.

The Tide Telemetry System supplies comprehensive, reliable, real-time tide level and meteorological to the most flood-prone areas in the back bay. Currently we have 25 tide gauges. Five of those tide gauges have National Weather Service standard weather stations colocated at them. We have 31 tidal crest-stage gauges and nine computer base stations. I'll describe a little bit about what each of the gauges are.

Locations of the gauges are, like I said before, in the back bay areas. They're located on or near coastal evacuation routes, on State roads and bridges. We do have some at Coast Guard stations, and then we do have some on private properties, in marinas and such.

This might be a little difficult to see, but it does show you the map of the other flood warning systems that we have in. But the small blue triangles are the tide gauges. The yellow ones with the red dot -- those are our weather stations. We have one weather station in each of the five coastal counties. And then the red triangles -- those are the tidal crest-stage gauges, which I'll explain to you.

The tide gauges -- I won't go into too much detail of the technical stuff. But we're using the same technology -- the same acoustic technology that NOAA and the National Ocean Service uses. The gauges were actually installed, initially, by National Ocean Service. What they're doing is, they measure-- Every two seconds, they take a reading of the tide

level. And those are averaged into six-minute readings. They're temperature-compensated, and they're precise to a hundredth of a foot.

This is a small schematic of what a tide gauge looks like -- just with the acoustical sensor. And I'm sure in your coastal counties you've seen them. You're probably very familiar with them. This is one of our weather stations. And as you can tell by the picture, with the Borgata in the back, this is our Atlantic City weather station. This is on the Coast Guard Base in Atlantic City. This is a tide gauge, and then it also has a weather station -- sensors -- which is precip, air temperature, water temperature, wind speed, direction, barometric pressure. And at some of our stations, we have relative humidity.

A tidal crest-stage gauge-- We have 31 of these throughout the state. These are simple, nonmechanical devices. These do not provide real-time data. But they are there for redundancy, as far as if our primary sensor fails. We have these colocated with our primary sensors, in addition to the other 31. They're there so that we can confirm our peaks -- what our equipment records. We can say-- If this matches up with it, we can say, "Yes, we didn't have any malfunctions or anything." And then it also helps us carry the tide level into the other locations where we just have the CSGs and we don't actually have the real-time equipment.

And when I say *real-time*-- What our tide gauges and weather stations have is -- they transmit both to the Internet and the network of our computer based stations through both telephone interrogation and the ghost satellite. Telephone interrogation-- The computer base stations that are located in each of the counties, and at the New Jersey Department of Transportation, National Weather Service, and at our office-- Most of

them are programmed to dial out -- the National Weather Service, definitely, and our computer base station. And what they do is they dial out, say, twice a day, maybe four times a day. And that will pull all the data from the previous phone call. So that's kind of just a backup to the satellite information.

Synthesized voice -- this is becoming very popular with our flood warning systems, because this is important when we're in a flood event. We can set the gauge to a certain flood level -- so say three feet -- and we know that we're going to start to have problems there. And those gauges will call out to an emergency manager -- to their cell phone, to their pager -- and say -- whether it's 3:00 in the morning, and they might not be looking at the computer -- "Hey, such-and-such a tide gauge is at three feet. You might want to take a look at it." So it's kind of nice. You don't have to be in front of a computer, because the tide gauge will call you.

Our GOES telemetry -- it's a satellite that's operated by NOAA. For this we have timed transmissions. As I said, we're recording, every six minutes, the tide level. And then every hour we transmit the data. That's on a routine -- you know, every single hour of every single day, we're transmitting data. And that data is going to the network base stations and also to the World Wide Web, to the public. So everybody is seeing the data at the same time.

In a flood event or hurricane event, sometimes 45-minute-old data is not really good enough. So we have random transmissions that are set. So every six minutes, when we're recording that data, if that data is above a certain flood level that we set, it's automatically transmitting it to

the Web. So at the oldest, you're getting six-minute data. So you can tell exactly what's going on at your gauges.

And then the little schematic there just kind of shows how it goes from the gauge to the GOES satellite, and how it goes through our computers, and then to yours.

This is our New Jersey Water Science Center homepage. If you go to this homepage, this is how you can access the data. There's other places where our data resides or sites that link to this. But this is probably the easiest means to get to it. If you just go to our homepage at [nj.usgs.gov](http://nj.usgs.gov), you'll see the little circle that lit up there. You're just going to go under the *Realtime Data* and click on *Streamflow Data*. That's going to bring you a listing of all the gauges that we have real-time in the state, not just the tide gauges. And that's going to be broken down by major basin. If you scroll all the way down to the bottom, tide gauges are at the bottom. And those are our 25 tide gauges. The data that it shows -- it gives the USGS station number in Maine. And the data that it shows is the very last transmission that came in. So that's the most current data that's come in for that particular gauge. If you want to see a hydrograph -- what's been happening, is the tide going up, coming down, what's going on -- you would just click on the station number, and then it's going to pull up the information for your gauge. All the data that we bring in is to elevation NAVD 88. But we do show, on each of the pages, conversions to Mean Lower Low Water, NGVD 29, and then you'll also get your hydrograph. And what we also can do, as you'll see on this one, is we have-- That red line down there is Mean Lower Low Water. So that just shows just the data so you have an idea that--

We can also take requests from county administrators. If they know a specific flood level at a gauge, we can put that line on there. If they know that the Newark gauge floods at three feet, we can put a warning flood stage on there. We can put an actual flood stage. So the general public or anybody can look at that. And it kind of makes a little more sense then.

How to get the data: Other than our Web site, you can also get it from the National Weather Service's HAD site, which the address is there. And that's pulling the data just as quickly as our Web site is pulling it.

All of our data is quality assured and published. The data that you do see on the Web, in real-time, obviously has not quite been quality assured. We do have settings set so that you're not going to get some crazy, bogus number. But every morning we come into the office, we check our gauges and we make sure everything looks reasonable for it to be on the Web. But after that, all of our data every year is quality assured, and we publish it in an annual data report. Prior to 2006, we've always published in a paper copy. But we've now gotten with the times, and we're doing everything on computers. So we have a computer-based Web address where, geographically, you can go, click the county, and you can see your gauges. But that's your historic data. That's obviously not real-time stuff.

The feature of our Tide Telemetry System: We have 25 gauges out there. We provide a pretty good infrastructure up and down the coast and the back bays for pretty much anything that can be added to them. Currently, most of them are just transmitting tide level. But there's nothing stopping us from adding water quality samples, traffic sensors -- because

we're on bridges -- or pretty much anything you can think of. As far as research and development, our data is used for a lot of ecological studies, characterization of the back-bay tidal regime. And they're used for more accurate tide and navigational charts.

Some things that we can look into are the real-time flood inundation mapping. The data is there, so we can definitely take that a step further and help out our users with maps so they see -- you know, at this level, this area is being inundated. And pretty much the possibilities are endless with the system.

This is just my contact information and our office contact information.

I will bring to your attention, though, the system is there and it's fantastic, as far as having the data there to be used for the purpose that pretty much everyone in this room seems to need. I know they rely heavily on the National Weather Service. And the Weather Service uses our tide data when they're making their forecasts and whatnot. But we do have an issue that the funding ceases for the Tide System on September 30 -- September 30. The Department of Transportation, who was paying for 50 percent of it -- the USGS was matching 50 percent -- the Department of Transportation has told us that they can no longer fund the system. So until we find additional funding, as of October 1 the system will be shut down.

MR. V. JONES: That's a serious concern for all of us, because we rely heavily on those gauges. We just had the flooding event on the Great Egg Harbor River. And had that -- the gauge notified us at flood stage, which gave us-- We have a six-hour window -- the stage -- and do

certain things, and make certain notifications. We would have had a lot more damage and a lot more people caught off guard had we not got the notice when that gauge hit its -- it was beginning to go up the river. Because it happened in the middle of the night, so we didn't-- The pagers went off, and we went, "Uh oh," started making notifications to the municipalities. And we use the one in the back bay all the time. And again, that's what's going to tell us-- It gives me my time window for Route 30 and some of these evacuation roads -- how much time we have to move these people. I mean, it's critical. When we found out about this, we made a lot of noise up and down the state trying to get people on board to try to -- if they could persuade DOT, or at least have a conversation with DOT, to continue the funding. That's critical. But I believe-- I don't even know if they put it in the budget for this-- I mean, I think that's it. They just have no intention of funding it after this.

MR. SEVER: I have to support Vince.

With a recent storm, we used one. It's located-- We call it Norma (phonetic spelling) -- the Morris River. And we use that constantly. As soon as a rain event starts, we're on there monitoring that regularly throughout the day and night. And if we lose that station, that's going to be -- it would be detrimental for us downstream. That goes right down into the Union Lake -- all that water. And we check that, and we communicate with the officials at Union Lake, so the opening and closing of the gates of Union Lake-- If we lose that funding October 1, we will have no way of monitoring the water levels. We'll be out of luck.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you.

Joe.

MR. McCALL: Thank you, Assemblyman.

From Cape May County, we echo those same sentiments. Those gauges are strategically placed, one on the Dennis Creek, which is Route 47. And it's very, very vital to that north-south traffic. And the other gauges that are placed are behind key locations like Ocean City; the Wildwoods, which normally go under water at seven feet on the western end of the five-mile beach. So the importance of these gauges-- We monitor these 24 hours a day. The importance of these to ourselves, to my peers in the other counties, is just absolutely vital.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER FROM AUDIENCE: Question: What's the annual cost of the DOT's share?

MS. HOPPE: Rick, you might want to--

**R I C H A R D H. K R O P P:** (speaking from audience) It's about \$225,000 per side.

MS. HOPPE: Per side, right.

MR. KROPP: For a total of about 450. We put up half, and the DOT puts up half.

MR. SEVER: What was the total cost for the State of New Jersey for this whole project then?

MR. KROPP: About \$225,000 a year is what DOT-- They would put half the money, we would put up half the money. So we each put up about \$225,000.

MR. SEVER: For the total project.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: What's going to happen to the infrastructure that's there? What happens to these devices?

MR. KROPP: Well, I mean, we would like to continue to operate them. But we can't operate them without the funds. They'll sit there. But at some point, we'd have to take them out. And I think that's the bigger shame -- is the investment that went into the infrastructure to put them in was well over a million-and-a-half dollars. So the operating costs really are insignificant compared to that, considering how the data is used.

And now that the notice has gone out saying that we're going to be shutting them down, we're probably going to have people like the Monmouth County Health Department, who uses the tide information and the temperature information--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Oh, can you come to the-- I'm sorry, please come to the microphone.

MS. LECKNER: This is also a statewide problem. It's an inland problem with the gauges, as well as a coastal. Just to let everybody know, it's not just the gauges on the coast, but there's this constant lack of funding for the gauges inland, as well. It's a problem statewide.

MR. KROPP: And I just want to start off by kind of somewhat defending DOT. They've been our partner in this for 10 years. They basically said, "We don't have enough money to fix the roads and the bridges. We've got so many competing priorities. We just can't do it this year." They gave us three months worth of funding so we could at least go out and find other partners. So, I mean, they have been good partners and strong partners. They're just like everybody else -- they're running out of money. And so we're looking for other partners. And that's really what it was about.

But I was going to say, Monmouth County called us and said that they use it for the temperature information when they have blooms in the tides, and they're worried about that issue. So, I mean, here we didn't even know that people were using it for other than emergency management. And as notice is getting out that they're going to be shutting down, we're getting inundated with phone calls, whether it's marinas, or shipping industries, and everybody else. But they're not the source of funds. That's going to be the problem. They all want to use it, but there's really no source. So we're willing to talk to the counties, we're willing to talk to anybody, we're willing to continue to put up the Federal half of that -- the funding for that -- in trying to keep this going.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I'm trying to think of-- I mean, we're going to research if there is something that we can do as a Task Force. We have very limited authority and a scope here as to what we can do. I don't know if we can issue a letter. And what concerns me as well is it's already August. So we've got September, and then we're pretty much there.

MR. KROPP: But we also have some support in the Office of Emergency Management and the State Police. Mike has been very helpful. And he's been looking around. So there's people looking, and something may show up. But we're just concerned that we're getting closer and closer to the end of September.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: If there is any way the individual legislators can help or -- I'm sure the counties would be more than -- Freeholder Sheets was here, the Executive was here. I'm sure they'd be willing to help, as well.

MR. KROPP: Maybe one option would be to split it up among the counties and have each county pick up a little bit of it. Because if you spread that over all the counties, it's not going to be that much money per county, and maybe we can do it that way. So we'd be interested in talking to anybody.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Ten or fifteen thousand dollars -- I guess about \$12,000.

Yes.

MR. KEMPF: May I ask a question through the Chair, sir?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes.

MR. KEMPF: Is this in conjunction with, or a spin off, or instead of that work that was just done by the Stevens Institute?

MR. KROPP: They're doing-- We picked up, actually -- Heidi -- the relationship of this with the Stevens Institute gauge -- we just picked up responsibility for their--

MS. HOPPE: We picked up responsibility for one of their gauges a couple of years ago. The problem they were having-- It was actually their Newark gauge -- the gauge that I showed the hydrograph for. They didn't have the funding for operations and maintenance. And we actually ran into them at the Hydromat (phonetic spelling) meeting that Mariana had put together, pretty much addressing funding problems. And we ran into them. And we were actually in the process of relocating our Newark gauge. And we were looking, pretty much, to put it within a half-mile of his. And he said, "Well, I'll give you my equipment if you can operate and maintain it." Well, we already had a funding source, so we took over his gauge.

Stevens Institute still operates their water quality monitor, which is right next to it -- right next to our tide gauge. But we did take over his equipment, and we took over the operations and maintenance of that. And then we did go in on a proposal with him. I'm trying to think of the--

MR. KROPP: Tom Harrington. (phonetic spelling)

MS. HOPPE: --yes, with Tom Harrington on a proposal for flood inundation mapping and that kind of stuff. Unfortunately, it didn't get -- the proposal didn't get accepted. But we have been trying to work as closely with pretty much anybody else who is gauging. Because we don't want to be on top of each other. And that was definitely an eye-opener for Tom and for us to realize that we had two Newark gauges that were right next to each other, where we could have kind of spread those out a little bit. But it was good that we were able to take over their gauge so that they didn't lose it.

MS. LECKNER: And Tom still has four--

MR. KEMPF: Thank you, sir.

MS. LECKNER: Tom still has four active gauges in the coastal monitoring network, including the most recent one at Sea Girt. So he still has four that--

Is he providing you with data? I have forgotten whether he has--

MR. KROPP: Yes.

MS. HOPPE: Yes, he's providing--

MR. KROPP: Ocean Grove is the latest one.

MS. LECKNER: Okay.

MR. EBERWINE: Mr. Van Drew, we're probably the biggest user of this Tide Telemetry System. And it came about, as Heidi said, after the 1992 storm, which was the biggest storm since the 1962 storm, which caused millions of dollars--

We use it all the time in Winter storms -- all the time. And if you're putting together a Task Force for hurricane evacuation studies -- well, what are you evacuating for? You are evacuating for the water levels. So if you don't have these tide gauges in place, we're not going to have any idea of what the water level is going to be, at what rate it's going to rise. And the most important thing is-- As Vince has said, it's an oceanfront event, initially. But the back bays cut off the access roads, and now you have no way off of Brigantine Island, you have no way off of Long Beach Island. And we've been using these gauges every day, every day. We use them for -- not only when the water goes above a certain level, but when it goes lower than what is considered safe for navigation in the causeways that are not in the coastal waterways.

We used them during the oil spill -- the Athos I -- to find out how low the water was at a particular time. We used it for the winds, we used it for the current. These gauges are the lifeline to issuing our coastal flood warnings.

And by the way, New Jersey was one of the first -- first state in the country that actually was able to categorize its flooding based on the gauges that were set up. We now use *minor* tidal flooding, *moderate*, and *severe*. And we have these levels all listed, depending on what part of the coast you're at, both on the oceanfront and in the back bay; going up the Delaware Bay, as well.

So the idea behind these gauges is to put out warnings in sufficient time for people to move their automobile. And when you look at the price of one automobile at the shore, you're talking \$30,000. So if you're able to move, say, 100 vehicles because the tide is going to reach, say, six-and-a-half feet above, you're saving a lot of dollars and you're saving probably what it cost to run the network of the gauges. And they're the best thing outside of the emergency managers in these counties, that give us the reports, and phone in, and tell us what's happening in that particular county.

We look at all the data. It's used by the Hurricane Center; it's used by the academic community, as they pointed out. Tom Harrington and Stevens Institute -- he's been using it for many, many years. We have the people at Rutgers University. Everybody is using the National Weather Service and New Jersey, here, as an example of how to do their Tide Telemetry System. We had this in place before North Carolina, which floods all the time, which always has a hurricane threat.

So you're looking at a program which is the lifeline of any study that's going to come after that, whether it's hurricane evacuation studies or any kind of study that's going to have to move masses of people. You've got to know what the level of these waters are, because they can flood in a heartbeat. They can shut down access roads. And now your best laid plans of getting people out are now down the drain, so to say.

But, anyway, it's the best thing to come along since I've been in the weather service. When I first came in, in '72, we had a couple of gauges -- one or two gauges. And we used to do what Senator Bradley used to do, walk the beaches so we could see what was the hot spot here in Monmouth

County and Cape May County. And we know those hot spots. But when you can actually look at remote data from the USGS, and get that information into your office, and then match that up with what the computers are saying our water levels should be from this storm, it's worth its weight in gold. And it's one of the finest systems that you're going to see in the country, and it's used very well.

The other thing, too, with all the concern about global warming, they're talking about the level of the ocean rising. And here we already have a system in place that's been measuring the level of the ocean for the last 20 years. And it's only going to get better. And if we can see these subtle little rises, like up in Tuckerton on Green Street, or the Fifth Street boat ramp down in Wildwood, or up at Sea Bright-- I mean, we're a step ahead of just about everybody that's doing this. And it's a tremendous system, and it makes life much easier for me as a forecaster, when I put these coastal flood warnings out -- especially when I'm working with Frank McCall over here. (laughter)

But Frank has been very good in pushing the point that: yes, you have the tide coming in, but what also exacerbates it is the rainfall. And he's been after us for many, many years. So a lot of our statements are compliments of Frank McCall here.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Very good.

I think he likes your work.

MR. McCALL: Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: A real quick question, just as an aside: Have you noticed there's all this discussion of global warming and

the waters rising? Have you seen anything over the years -- I mean, over the last -- since you've been doing this?

MS. HOPPE: I can't say that I've-- I personally have taken over the Tide Telemetry program for the last three years. I have only been--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I know, but looking over the past data.

MS. HOPPE: As a whole, I honestly haven't looked at it in that sense -- to be looking for something like that. But I definitely agree it would be something to look into.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: We'll do whatever we can, I mean, as individual legislators. And we're going to find out if there's something we can do in the form of -- because the recommendation-- This Task Force is going to take a while before all these recommendations come out. But if there is something we can do in the shorter term, let us know individually. I'm sure there are individual legislators that would-- And we'll see if we can do something in the shorter term, as well, as far as at least a letter to connect with whomever. We'll try.

MR. EBERWINE: And, also, one final point, if I may: The Atlantic City site has the longest standing, I think, water and air temperature record of any place on the East Coast. It goes back to 1912.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Wow.

MR. EBERWINE: Now, this is not only important for flooding and things, but it's also important to the fish life and for the shellfish community -- if the water is getting warmer, or colder, and stuff like that.

I mean, as Mr. Arroyo said, I can go on for hours and hours, but I'll cut it short here.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: It would be interesting to see, with all this concern about the water rising and global warming, if there is any money out there for that reason, as well. Because that's a really big issue. The Governor's expressed a tremendous amount of interest in it. And, nationally, there is. And I just wonder, because obviously you'd be able to monitor that. And that's a direction I would look at, as well. Because I think there's a lot of interest there, obviously.

MR. KROPP: And the long-term data sets are the most valuable when they're used in that way.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes.

MR. KROPP: So if we could keep it going, we'd like to.

MR. EBERWINE: Well, when they had the tsunami several years ago, the water rose six inches on the beach in Atlantic City as a result of that -- to give you an idea of how fine these things can measure the water level.

MS. LECKNER: A couple of funding suggestions might be: the EMPG funds that go to State Police -- sometimes at the end of the fiscal year there are projects that default, that were budgeted for it. So sometimes there's leftover money. And it's a varying amount. But even if there's a little bit that might go to it--

I would suggest maybe Sergeant Massa or Major Arroyo can certainly give a little more of that. That doesn't normally come up till about November or so, after the cycling kind of happens. But sometimes there is that EMPG money left over on defaulted grants.

The other thing is, there is GCEs (phonetic spelling). And I don't remember exactly what the acronym stands for, but it is a governor's

discretionary fund for -- I believe it's for emergency management response, but I don't know how the -- how it's actually written, what the format is written -- that maybe it can go towards emergency preparedness, as well as-- I think it's a fund that's supposed to be used in case we don't get Federal funding, sort of, as State--

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: For certain--

MS. LECKNER: Yes. But maybe that's something that there could be some discretionary on that.

And the only other thing I can think -- and I think about Oklahoma -- and Jerry and I met in Oklahoma a few years back -- is partnering with the universities and seeing if there are research institutions that are eligible for research grants associated with sea-level rise, different things -- whether it's Tom Harrington's group, or Coastal Marine Sciences at Rutgers, or any of the other universities we have -- that they may be eligible, and we might be able to kind of camp on using them as research projects, essentially, for faculty and students.

Those are three suggestions.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Very good.

MR. McCALL: Assemblyman.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Yes, Mr. McCall.

MR. McCALL: If I may, sometimes we in emergency management can help ourselves by helping you. And everyone is always looking elsewhere for funding. And everybody thinks this guy has it, or that gal has it, and it's in somebody's back pocket.

One of the things I think the State Office of Emergency Management has been very, very good at -- particularly in recent years,

when it comes to the Federal fiscal year funding under Homeland Security Funds -- is developing investment justifications. And I think there were 11 or 12 investment justifications for the FY '07 Homeland Security funds. And some of the look in New Jersey is not just terrorism/counterterrorism, but giving those the opportunity to be able to buy into the funding program based on their needs locally, in the county. And perhaps we, as emergency management coordinators, can go through the system and, in the FY '08 fiscal year funding, partner up with you folks in asking for an investment justification category. And of the millions and millions of dollars that come into New Jersey-- If we're looking for a half a million bucks, and it's doing the kinds of things that we've heard from Jim Eberwine -- our own county engineer uses this for raising roads -- perhaps we can help you help ourselves by passing that word up through the Homeland Security funding justification -- investment justifications for Fiscal Year '08.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Very good.

MR. KROPP: We'll meet with you at any time, get you any information. Heidi's my walking guru on the system. So if you need any information, if we need to provide any other support, we'll do that. We appreciate that.

MR. McCALL: Terrific, thank you.

MS. HOPPE: And our fact sheet was passed around to you. So everyone should have a copy of the fact sheet, which has the Web addresses and everything. And I have plenty of business cards.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: You make her do the PowerPoint every time? (laughter)

Very good. Thank you very much.

MS. HOPPE: Thanks.

MR. KROPP: Thank you.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Next we have Jerry McAteer and Rick Rossi, and they're going to speak about special needs victims.

**G E R A L D M. M c A T E E R:** Good morning, Assemblyman.

And thank you for having us down here to speak in front of the board.

We're here on behalf of New Jersey's Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, in OEM. We're actually going to talk today about a pilot project that we're doing in the four coastal counties here in New Jersey.

Is that it? (referring to PowerPoint presentation) There we go.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: I actually remember when this started. I spoke to the big boss about it.

MR. McATEER: We've actually started this project off again with the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management, leading the planning effort for the project in the evacuation project overall. And then we have the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security that's actually providing the funding for the four coastal counties in this pilot.

The pilot counties, again: Atlantic County, Monmouth County, Ocean, and Cape May County, which I think are all represented here today in some fashion.

The project team actually is developed from Delta Development Group. We're a company based out of Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. And our two partner organizations are Emergency Preparedness Partnerships, which is a small business here in -- I think

outside of Trenton -- and then TraynorKirk & Company, also based out of New Jersey.

Our project stakeholders really are the special needs populations; State and local officials -- yourselves included -- State and local government agencies; paratransit organizations; health, aging, social services, nonprofit organizations; Red Cross, Salvation Army; and then our private sector partners: the utilities, the power plants, phone companies, things of that -- hospitalities, the casinos.

The true project goals are to engage our community stakeholders in awareness of the special needs populations and how it impacts evacuations and disaster management. The end goal with this is to effectively register individuals with special needs and allow them to plan preparedness kits -- get ready. How do they deal with a disaster? How do they effectively self-evacuate themselves? What we've talked about today -- and really to improve our disaster planning, day-of. How do we deal with a disaster today? How do we prepare for it four or five days in advance?

We're really taking the ends, ways, and means approach to dealing with a disaster. What's *ends*? The health and safety of individuals, the wellness, the welfare of those individuals in New Jersey. The ways we're doing that: Our methodology has really been our founding approach to this. Going through, doing the demographic study, finding out who the population is, where are they, how do we address them.

The next aspect of that is to really do a communications and marketing outreach plan from there. Once we've been able to do that, register the individuals, truly capture where those individuals are at, start using GIS to the best of its ability, and now analyzing that and then coming

out and being able to do a shelter analysis. Where are these people at? Where are we going to put these people? How do we know what needs they need? What resources are going to be needed to be brought to bear for these individuals? And then doing the technical guidance and wrap-up, evaluating -- that gap assessment that I've heard today, time and time again, from FEMA -- from the Department of Military and Veterans Affairs to the counties. What is that gap assessment to our emergency operations plans, our hazard mitigation plans, our radiological emergency response plans? How do we really look at those plans, and where do the special needs populations fit into those plans?

Again, the means: facilitate outreach sessions; using GIS to the best of our abilities; a comprehensive marketing campaign, really reaching the grassroots of these individuals, day-to-day knocking on people's doors getting them to register -- using a registry tool, our Total Visibility software application, actually registering these individuals; and then reviewing plans, supporting infrastructure, documents; and gathering special needs shelter information.

In our demographic study, we're really looking at the stakeholders. Who are the people that impact that community? How do we get to them? Review best practices: What has worked before for these organizations? Develop a profile for those citizens: Who are these individuals with special needs -- whether it's using the state's SNAP group. Evaluating what is in place: How do we contact those people, and how do we identify where they live in our communities?

Once we've been able to actually identify the demographic study, we can go into the communications and marketing portions of this

and really look at increasing registration, targeting that demographic study, using it, and hitting that key population group for us; and just maintaining close coordination with our stakeholders. And public information and outreach -- promote self-preparedness throughout that community. The reality is, it's going to be bad when the storm hits. Category 3 -- it's going to be bad. Where are these people going to go? How can they be self-sufficient? They're going to tax the resources of emergency management, whether at the municipal, county, or State level -- even Federal level. How do we have those individuals self-prepare themselves?

The registry: It helps identify where these people are at -- GIS enabled -- allowing emergency management to truly identify quickly and accurately in the community. How do we allocate our resources to deal with those individuals and move those individuals -- whether it's collecting information on individuals that are hearing impaired, wheelchair bound, dialysis. What are we going to do with those individuals? Again, using GIS -- a day-of emergency, whether it's a hazmat plume, a nuclear EPZ, or a Category 3 that comes up the coastline and impacts the four coastal counties.

Shelter analysis: Once we've been able to capture that information, get people registered in the system, estimate the number of evacuees with special needs. Where are we going to put medical needs personnel? What are the resources that are going to be needed at those shelters? Where are the locations of those shelters? We understand that Cape May is pretty much going to be under water. I don't think a special needs shelter would probably be -- a key location in Cape May for it. Where do I identify where those people are going to be placed? How do I

evacuate those people? We've talked about D-plus-5 for the emergency management community -- 39-mile-an-hour winds, tropical force winds when they hit the coastline. Special needs populations are going to need more than 40 or 48 hours to move. If we could preidentify those individuals, move them out 72 to 96 hours prior to, or at least plan for them, we free up resources that are going to be needed during the time of the disaster. What are the post-sheltering accommodations for those individuals, long-term?

I think, Frank, you mentioned that we're going to have people out for three or four weeks, maybe. We've heard the gentleman from FEMA mention that it was 60 days that people weren't allowed back into their homes. What do we do with those individuals with special needs in the community? Where do we place them? Where do we provide assistance in moving them and relocating them with family members?

And then really doing the technical guidance review, after action: How have we done? What have we missed? Where are the next steps at the county and regional planning efforts? How does that get incorporated into our planning? And doing the lessons learned.

And, again, the project overview -- it's a, really, building process. We've taken the demographic study, we've identified the people, we've moved in the communications, marketing, and outreach aspect of this. The crux of the system, of the project -- really identifying those individuals.

Registering them on the system: getting to know where they're at, getting their involvement in the community, allowing them to get prepared, giving them the tools to be prepared. Doing the shelter analysis:

Once we identify these individuals, where can we place them? Where can they go? And then doing the evaluation, the technical guidance, and wrap-up.

Next steps: How can we enhance what we're doing, moving forward? How can this Task Force help? How can this community help? Really, it's to help us promote the system at the county level, move the project along, get your stakeholders to buy in, allowing us to do our job to the best of -- to maximize our efforts. We've had community outreach meetings in three of the four pilot counties to date. Over 110 organizations were interviewed. We still have 40 to 50 more, as this project is really just beginning. We're two months into a year-long project. We're still working, actively, to engage those stakeholders and provide our citizens with baseline information: What does it mean to be prepared?

You can help by helping us shape and promote the project moving forward, and everything that we're doing day in and day out. How do we enhance our efforts in the community? And help with the registration. Our stakeholders: How can we get them involved to assist in that registration process?

The major milestones that we're looking at over the next year are really having that demographic study completed by September; the on-line registry also by September-October time frame -- we're waiting for some of the internal workings of the systems to get up and running. Final demographic study by October, signed off and completed as to our methodology. Where we've come from; the best-case scenario that we've walked through, using all the information that we capture from our stakeholders' interview. Drafting, then marketing and strategy outreach.

How do we target those communities? How do we reach out to them? Faith-based organizations, Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster -- VOAD groups. How do we contact them? How do we encourage them to promote this for us? Then we go into our communications plan, and really unfolding how do we do our next steps. Longevity: make sure the system stays up and running. Continuation -- continued buy-in. Doing our shelter analysis in the springtime: How do we really identify what are those shelters? Hopefully by next hurricane season we have them identified and we can truly manage special needs populations as they deal with shelters.

Is it going to be all-encompassing? Probably not. Will it be a baseline start? Absolutely. It will give us a good stepping stone, moving forward. And then doing the technical review -- again, that stepping stone. How do we enhance what we've done and increase our knowledge base for dealing with special needs?

**RICHARD J. ROSSI:** I'd say one of the biggest things here, too, is, when we look at -- we, as in Delta. We're extra hands, we're facilitating. We have the methodology and the time to get this done, but we can't do this alone. The *we* that Jerry is talking about, and that we're talking about in this presentation, is the Office of Homeland Security, it's the OEM, it's all four counties and their OEMs that have been actively engaged to this point. We've only been in this two months. But without the help of each of the four OEM directors, we wouldn't be where we are. They've helped to go beyond and identify the stakeholders that we need to get involved. They've actively set up the meetings, they've participated, and they're the ones that are going to make this successful.

And beyond that, it's the-- Once you have your demographic study, and you know what your baseline is, and you can make some assumptions about how many people will really need to be evacuated and have help, and then you get a demographic analysis -- so then your marketing plan. You have to get them to register.

And I just want to echo what we've heard all today: is, how can the State help? And it's getting the people to know that this is a serious issue, and that the State is making ground on this, and where to register, and where to get involved. And from our methodology, and from looking at best practices, and working in the state of Pennsylvania with this -- to reach out to your local organizations: Meals on Wheels, the dialysis -- people who, day in and day out, work with these subsets of people with special needs. And to get them to promote your message is very trustworthy, instead of the State saying, "Give us your information." That helps at an executive level; but reaching down into the grassroots campaign is what can really make the difference of getting somebody to sign up, and trusting the program and the system.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Very good.

Just a couple of quick questions. Special needs-- Would you just define them again -- the folks that we're talking about -- nursing homes, hospitals, homebound, assisted living?

MR. ROSSI: There is a very specific definition, that we will get the committee, that the State has put. I guess-- And it's too long.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: It encompasses some of that, I believe.

MR. ROSSI: Yes, it does. But I think, in a simple one, it's somebody who can't understand, receive, or respond to emergency evacuation orders. And this process is really focusing on individuals that are self-sufficient or semi self-sufficient, that aren't in registered facilities that are required by the State to have plans.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: That are not.

MR. ROSSI: That are not.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay.

MR. ROSSI: And that is the focus of this project.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And how do you find them? Do you find them through the individual groups and the county OEMs?

MR. McATEER: We're working through all the stakeholder communities, whether it's the deaf and hard of hearing association, whether it's the blind association, whether it's the ambulatory associations, the renal facilities, the associations that deal with these individuals day in and day out, dialysis centers. We're actively working with the dialysis group, right now, to reach that target community by saying, "If you are somebody on dialysis, you need assistance every three days to get your dialysis, and you have to be evacuated--" How do we get those individuals to register? It's a lot easier, when you come in for your dialysis day in and day out, to actively have that secretary or that doctor facilitate that communication and outreach. They're a trusted person. You're going to them for treatment already. That's the real conduit for this tool to work.

MR. ROSSI: And I think the other thing, too, is, this isn't something new. We're not at the beginning of creating something new, nor when this project is done will it be the end. The counties, for years, have

identified, through different methods, people that need help. What this project is trying to do is take what they've learned, look around the country, take best practices, and move it a step beyond, with their help, to get a more structured system, to provide State resources, to push out the marketing, and to engage the locals to make this successful.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Okay.

MS. LECKNER: I have a couple of questions -- I'm sure nobody is surprised -- as usual.

First of all, I want to say it's great that you're doing this. It's something that definitely is necessary. As a former chairman for the Special Needs Advisory Panel for the State, I know how difficult it is to kind of get this in motion and get things going. So I think this is a great thing to happen.

I had a question about the software. Is the software going to be given to the counties, or is it proprietary where there is an annual licensing, as far as the database is concerned?

MR. ROSSI: With the software-- Actually, we sold the license to the State, and the State is going to host it. And we're working through, for the pilot, where they're going host it. Probably at the OEM or OIT -- probably -- the Office of Information Technology.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: So every county is going to have a list of addresses and people that need extra help, right?

MS. LECKNER: Yes, basically.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Which is a separate plan from what we're doing with hospitals, nursing homes, and those types of facilities.

MS. LECKNER: Yes.

And under New Jersey legislation, the hospitals, nursing homes, etc. -- any licensed facility, whether it's DCA, DHS, or DHSS -- must have, in the plans, evacuation plans. Now, they generally do have the evacuation plans for facility evacuation. What's missing is the evacuation plan for having to relocate. But that is sort of a separate issue than working with the individuals in the community, because now you're working with facility planning. And usually you evacuate to like facilities. It's a little different than what's going on.

The estimated-- I know it's early in the game. Is there any idea, from your research in other areas, what the estimated annual cost might be for any of the counties on the (indiscernible)? Because doing the outreach, I know Ocean County spent some \$40,000 and only even canvassed half the county. And that wasn't even including hiring somebody to type stuff in and maintain that. Do you have any idea of what other places--

MR. ROSSI: At this point, we're two months into a year project. At this point, we don't have an estimate of what it will take annually. And we will, as we go forward, because I think that's a very valid point. Because you can't--

MS. LECKNER: It's back to the gauges.

MR. ROSSI: --just start this program. We can help get it jump-started, but it's year, after year, after year, whether you use this program or whatever a county is doing currently. They know that you have to stay on top of these, because people move, people pass on, new people come into the system. But that's something that we'll definitely note and

try to look at a marketing effort of what will it take to sustain this, so the State knows, the Legislature knows, and the executives know -- at least in our technical review -- what we think it would take to continue and improve.

MR. McATEER: And with the registering of people -- we have looked at that, we've analyzed that. It's been a constant feedback from everybody we've talked to. "We don't have the staff. We don't have the manpower." The State has brought to the table New Jersey 2-1-1. That's going to assist in that process. They have come to the table. They will assist us in the registering of individuals. We're not 100 percent sure of how it's going to unfold through the marketing and communications outreach. But their telephonic registry people will take those phone calls. If it means that the next public service announcement is, "If you're somebody with special needs, call 2-1-1 and they'll assist in the registry process," that, right there, will be, I'm sure, astronomical in the amount of staff hours of registering people that could be brought to bear on anyone's project, at all accounts, across the entire state.

MR. ROSSI: That's a great point. And besides, at the State level, putting in those kinds of resources, one thing the tool will allow you to do is, if you have large civic organizations, large church groups, they can register their individuals, their members, and help you keep track of them. So you can push it up to the State with the resources they're bringing in, and also down to your county coordinators, and even out to nonprofit organizations to help you register.

MS. LECKNER: And that sounds good. I'd like to encourage, also, the use of SecureCorps, which is a branch of AmeriCorps. Where, for

\$10,000 a year, you can hire somebody who is-- Basically it's like AmeriCorps, except they specialize in security issues. That might be something to offer the counties -- is to consider that. It's a January through December commitment, and you have to pay the \$10,000 up front. But they work for you full-time, for 12 months, for \$10,000 and nothing else.

I would also submit that you make sure, with the Attorney General's Office-- We could never get an opinion -- an official opinion -- from the Attorney General's Office on the use of outside organizations in collecting that information. We had talked about using college students. These days, a lot of -- especially community colleges have service projects that you're required to do to get your degree -- thought about going that route, because it's free. And there was the issue of HIPAA violations or other sorts of privacy law violations -- of using people who are not within the Emergency Management system. And I think that church groups and others might fall into that. So that's just something. We never got that ruling. What the Attorney General's Office told us was that that would be up to each individual county -- would have to go to their counsel to find out their -- through their county statutes, also, how that would function. So that's kind of a comment on that.

And, also-- Well, I guess training is not that much.

Those, I guess, are my biggest comments because, again, having been through that and trying to get-- We got, I think, five counties started prior to 2006. And it was on a voluntary basis. And those counties did a lot to -- you know, Atlantic County and others did a lot to go out of their way. Ocean County was one of the first. It is a huge effort, and I commend the counties, as well as your efforts on that.

MR. McATEER: Thank you.

MR. ROSSI: Thank you.

And I guess just two other things that have jogged forth with your comments. One is, we've also been in contact and made a presentation with CERT as a possibility to help in many different ways. And we've also been working with the counties to take what they have -- make sure we can take that data and put it in there so they're not losing anything, and then move forward.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you.

Wayne.

MR. RUPERT: We, in Ocean County, have been doing something similar for a long time. And what we had found worked best for us is, we send the cards out, and we tell the people, "If you need to register, let us know." We send the card out to them, and the card is turned into their local people. The local people have the ability to take better -- keep better track of it than we have.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Sure.

MR. RUPERT: So that when somebody does pass on, they know to remove that person, because they're more familiar with it -- especially some of the coastal communities, which are fairly small populations.

We've also found that there is a-- As you go up the governmental ladder, the distrust factor begins to creep in. (laughter) They don't mind dealing with--

If you can imagine such a-- (laughter)

They don't mind so much talking to their local people. But when it comes to the county, it's maybe this way. And the State is -- very reluctant to talk to the State. And you get on up to the Federal level -- sorry State (laughter) -- when you get up to the Federal level, they really don't want anything to do with it. So that's been our experience with it. And it's worked well for us. Could it be improved? Certainly. But that's been our experience.

MR. ROSSI: And, you know, we've heard those comments in other counties too, about the trust level. And one of the things -- and even we got that when we were working with counties in Pennsylvania. One of the things that they've liked and taken as an advantage is, you can let those local police departments in, with a secure access level, to just their municipality. And they can still do the same thing and have the advantage of the tool, which then can also roll up to the county. So you can see them run more what-if scenarios on a county level. They can use it locally. So if there is a hazmat spill, or there has to be a shelter-in-place announcement, they can definitely see that and then move on. And that's just one of those things that we'd be more than happy to work with your county in figuring out, how do we take what's working for you and hopefully add some value to that process?

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you.

Good, Wayne? (affirmative response)

Okay, Joe.

MR. SEVER: Cumberland-- We're not part of the process that you guys are involved in, not yet anyway. But what we have done in Cumberland is, we have worked with our Office on Aging. They put out a

newsletter periodically. We helped fund it for one month. We asked them to send back information on special needs. And we worked it through that office, because those people were already -- the Office on Aging had already gathered all that information, had contact names, phone numbers, all that stuff -- mailings. We worked through their system. We've taken that information back, we've provided it to our 9-1-1 center, they have it in the computer system there. We give a copy to our local coordinator; he has a binder that has been provided to him. So if there's an emergency, they can work from that information. And we still get information. We did that about a year ago, and we're still receiving information periodically from the Office on Aging.

We also have a part of the PSEG calendar, which is part of the nuclear program. There is a card on the back of that that says, "If you are in special need and want assistance, you are to send it into PSEG," and they provide that to us, also.

So our best luck has been with the Office on Aging. We tried to do it ourselves a number of years ago. We actually had Boy Scouts go into the areas as Eagle projects and put them on doorsteps, and all kinds of stuff. Return was very, very low. But the Office on Aging was the best going.

MR. ROSSI: That's helpful. Thank you.

And we have, so far, in our stakeholders' meetings in every county -- there's been an Office on Aging representative. And they've committed to work with the county and the State on the project.

MR. SEVER: Right. And you want to see if they have a newsletter. If they have a newsletter going out, that's the place. If you have to pay for part of it, or pay for a special edition like we did, it was worth it.

MR. McATEER: Thank you.

MR. ROSSI: Thank you.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Thank you, Joe.

MR. SEVER: Thank you.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Frank.

MR. McCALL: Thank you, Assemblyman.

We've been working, in Cape May County, for well over a decade on accessing the names of people who, in some way, shape, or form, fall into the special needs category.

Jeff, I had the same question that you had. How do you define special needs population of these folks? And when we had our kick-off meeting, we invited-- I guess the initial invitation probably had 85 or 90 kinds of agencies or groups that we thought in some way, shape, or form wrap their arms around some segment of the special needs population. And understanding there may have been some redundancy, we went to the department of Motor Vehicles, Atlantic Electric, our own Office on Aging, the ARC, the United Way. And, surprisingly so-- Usually when you send an invitation to come to a meeting, you're going to get about a 10 to 15 percent response. Our response was probably close to 50 percent of the agencies we invited. And we had a real lively day with the Delta folks and the EPP folks.

One of the things that we're seeing is a reluctance of some folks to identify themselves in a large database. They have no problem if they're

with the ARC -- registering with them and knowing who they are and what needs they have. They have no problem going to the next organization. The Cancer Society -- we're registering folks there -- we're looking to register folks there. But there is some kind of reluctance, for some reason. And I think all this will be overcome once the public relations campaign gets launched, once the final product for the software is up and running, and once there's an understanding that it's not necessarily a project going to be turned over to a half a dozen people to do the entry. But once the understanding is that those who are being entered can feel comfortable that it is their peers who are entering them, we think we're going to get a larger -- a very large participation.

We're guesstimating at numbers in Cape May County. And we're thinking the special needs population is somewhere between 16,000 and 22,000 people. Our goal is to get 100 percent of that. But, realistically, I think with the program that's been laid out through the process-- If we can get 80 to 85 percent, we'll be pretty much ahead of the game.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: And just for those that don't know, I think the highest per capita age is in Cape May County, and the highest percentage of seniors, I think, might be in Ocean County -- the highest number, anyhow -- the highest raw number. We may have the highest percentage, but you've just got a bigger number. So Ocean and Cape May particularly are, obviously, very impacted.

Any other questions?

MS. LECKNER: Just one more comment. Sorry.

The Office for the Disabled-- I know not every county has an Office for the Disabled. I'm working right now with Salem County, through the Office of the Disabled, in concert with Emergency Management.

I've been working with special needs for 10 years, and I can tell you there's a definite disconnect between special needs organizations and emergency management. Neither one knows the other one exists. And what we're doing is, we're working through the Office of the Disabled, bringing in emergency management. We've got-- We have State OEM rep-- We try to bring in everybody, get the locals in. We've had meetings with the locals. And we get a pretty good turnout working through the Office for the Disabled, again, because of the trust and suspicion issues. It seems to be working better. Ultimately, the registry will reside with the local emergency management coordinator, who is normally the police department. So it kind of works out as a wash. But it's sort of a marketing strategy, I guess, if you will.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Very good. Good.

Thank you for being here.

MR. McATEER: Thank you, Assemblyman.

MR. ROSSI: Thank you, sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN VAN DREW: Any other comments? (no response)

All right, we're going to adjourn this meeting, and we will announce where and when the next meeting will be held.

Thank you, all, very much for being here.

**(MEETING CONCLUDED)**